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Abstract
It is believed that interventions that change the media’s costs of misreporting can
increase the information provided by media outlets. This paper analyzes the validity
of this claim and the welfare implications of those types of interventions that affect
misreporting costs. I study a model of communication between an uninformed
voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates.
The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by the two
candidates. I show that higher costs may lead to more misreporting and persuasion,
whereas low costs result in full revelation; interventions that increase misreporting
costs never harm the voter, but those that do so slightly may be wasteful of public
resources. I conclude that intuitions derived from the interaction between the media
and voters, without incorporating the candidates’ strategic responses to the media
environment, do not capture properly the effects of these types of interventions.
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One of the most common criticisms leveled against the media is that they strategically
distort news to pursue their private interests and affect political outcomes.1 To counter
the threat posed by the spread of misinformation, most countries enforce laws that punish
the practice of misreporting information. Consider for example the United Kingdom’s
Representation of the People Act 1983 (Chapter 2, Part II, Section 106):
A person who, or any director of any body [...] which – (a) before or during an
election, (b) for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at the election,
makes or publishes any false statement of fact in relation to the candidate’s personal
character or conduct shall be guilty of an illegal practice.
More recently, several governments have passed “fake news laws” to address the growing
concern about distortions of the political process caused by misinformation. Most of these
efforts revolve around the idea of affecting media outlets’ costs of misreporting information
through, e.g., fines, jail terms, and awareness campaigns (Funke & Famini, 2018).2
This class of interventions is relevant not only because of its recent popularity, but
also because it seeks to steer the conduct of media outlets without interfering with the
markets’ concentration levels. In “news markets” a single outlet with private possession of
some information is in fact a monopolist over that particular piece of news. This is often
the case with scoops, scandals, and “October surprises.” Since breaking news spreads fast,
even small outlets can reach a large audience when endowed with a scoop that can swing
the outcome of an election.3 In these circumstances, interventions that affect the costs of
misreporting information might still discipline the behavior of those media outlets with
exclusive possession of political news. Despite its relevance, the regulation of misreporting
costs is currently highly understudied, and to date there is no formal model exploring its
consequences.4
In this paper, I study the welfare effects of regulatory interventions that impose costs
on media outlets for misreporting information. The key idea is that the implications
of media bias are not confined to distortions of voters’ choice at the ballot box, but
spread and propagate back to the process of policy-making. Ahead of elections, competing
candidates face a choice between gathering popular consensus with “populist” policies that
1This concern is substantiated by empirical evidence that media bias has an impact on voting behavior
(see, e.g., DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007) and by the observation that mass media are voters’ primary source
of policy-relevant information (see Gottfried, Barthel, Shearer, & Mitchell, 2016).
2Misreporting costs can be direct, such as the time and money required to misrepresent information,
or indirect and probabilistic, such as the loss of reputation and profits incurred by a media outlet if
caught in a lie. For more examples about “fake news laws,” see Funke and Famini (2018).
3In the “Killian document controversy,” online blogs’ revelation that CBS aired unauthenticated and
forged documents was quickly rebroadcast by a wide spectrum of media. See Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2008) for this and other examples.
4This is because most related work assumes that misreporting is either costless (e.g., in cheap talk
models) or not possible (e.g., in disclosure models). See Section 2 for a review of the relevant literature.
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benefit voters and seeking the endorsement of an influential media with “biased” policies
that please media outlets. Since media bias skews electoral competition and produces
distortions in policy outcomes, the informational and political effects of regulation need
to be jointly determined.
I consider a model of strategic communication between a media outlet and a repre-
sentative voter, where the policy alternatives available to the voter are endogenously
championed by two competing candidates running for office. In the policy-making stage,
the two candidates – an incumbent and a challenger – sequentially and publicly make a
binding commitment to policy proposals. Afterwards, in the communication subgame, the
media outlet delivers a public news report about the candidates’ relative quality, where
“quality” is defined as a candidate’s fit with the state of the world, competence, record, etc.
Given the proposals and the outlet’s report, the voter casts a ballot for one of the two
candidates. At the end, the policy proposed by the elected candidate gets implemented.
In contrast to canonical models of strategic communication, the media outlet bears a
cost of misreporting its private information about candidates’ quality that is increasing in
the magnitude of misrepresentation. The voter and the outlet have aligned preferences
over the relative quality of candidates (hereafter just “quality”), but disagree on which
policy is the best. Therefore, when candidates advance different proposals, there are
contingencies in which there is a conflict of interest between the outlet and the voter. An
agency problem emerges, as the outlet can strategically misreport information to induce
the election of its favorite candidate and seize political gains at the expense of the voter.
The main results provide a number of policy implications by showing how the regulation
of misreporting costs affects the voter’s welfare. I find that an increase in the costs of
misreporting information never harms the voter, but that a small incremental increase
might have no effect at all on the voter’s welfare. This result implies that, when carrying
out interventions is costly, lenient regulatory efforts can be wasteful of public resources. I
obtain conditions under which the voter is better off without a media outlet or alternatively
with an “electoral silence” period that forbids the delivery of policy-relevant news ahead of
the election.5 I also show that there is no monotonic relationship between the probability
that persuasion takes place and the voter’s welfare, and between the probability that
persuasion takes place and the costs of misreporting information. Interventions that
increase such costs might induce more misreporting and more persuasion, and yet improve
the voter’s welfare because of the availability of better policies. Therefore, the growing
concern that “proposed anti-fake news laws [...] aggravate the root causes fuelling the fake
news phenomenon” (Alemanno, 2018) is perhaps exaggerated. This also implies that the
empirical task of inferring the efficiency of such interventions from the media’s reporting
behavior is challenging, if not impossible.
5Some countries operate a pre-election silence period where even polling and campaigning are not
allowed in the run-up to an election, while in other countries such bans are unconstitutional.
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A natural question is whether politicians have the right incentives to propose inter-
ventions that benefit the voter.6 To answer this question, I extend the main model by
endogenizing the process of regulating misreporting costs, which takes place ahead of the
policy-making stage. I show that the electoral incentives of politicians together with the
sequential nature of policy proposals generate a friction in the regulatory process that
results in the selection of interventions that depress the voter’s welfare. The worst-case
scenario is obtained when the incumbent government is in charge of regulation: in this
case, the incumbent sets relatively low misreporting costs that trigger the convergence of
proposals to the media outlet’s favorite policy. Even though misreporting behavior is fully
eradicated, the voter’s welfare is at its minimum because of the induced policy distortion.
From the voter’s perspective, the resulting political outcome is abysmal, and equivalent
to that of a dystopic scenario where the media outlet has the voting rights to directly
decide upon which policy to implement and which candidate to elect. The situation is
better, but still far from ideal, when the challenger is in charge of regulation.
The intuition behind the above results is as follows. As the costs of misreporting
information decrease, both candidates offer more “biased” policies in the attempt to obtain
the endorsement of an increasingly persuasive media outlet. The candidates’ proposals
become progressively closer to each other until, for sufficiently low misreporting costs,
they fully converge on the outlet’s preferred policy. More similar policies imply a smaller
conflict of interest between the voter and the media outlet, and thus persuasion can
occur in a smaller number of contingencies as costs decrease. Eventually, the convergence
of proposals eradicates any conflict of interest as in these cases the only element that
can differentiate candidates is their relative quality, over which preferences are aligned.
Somewhat paradoxically, under low misreporting costs the media outlet has high persuasive
potential and yet it fully reveals its private information about quality. However, the
voter’s welfare is at its minimum because perfect knowledge about quality—and thus
perfect selection of candidates—comes at the cost of inducing a large distortion in terms
of policies, which are furthest from the voter’s ideal bliss policy. If candidates’ quality is
sufficiently less important than their policies, then the voter might be better off without a
media outlet at all.
Since policy convergence occurs for a set of sufficiently low but positive misreporting
costs, lenient interventions might be ineffective. On the other hand, a substantial increase
in the misreporting costs might trigger policy divergence and thus increase the contingencies
in which there is a conflict of interest, making room for more misreporting and persuasion.
In these cases, the voter’s welfare increases because the loss of information about quality
and the increased electoral mistakes are more than compensated by the availability of
better policies. When misreporting costs are sufficiently high, both candidates offer more
6Most fake news laws are introduced by members of incumbent governments, ministers, or government
factions (Funke & Famini, 2018; Law Library of Congress, 2019).
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“populist” policies to please the voter rather than the weakened media outlet. As costs
increase, the candidates’ proposals tend to converge back toward the voter’s preferred
policy, mitigating the conflict of interest and the occurrence of misreporting and persuasion.
The voter’s welfare is thus maximized by arbitrarily high misreporting costs.
To see how electoral incentives skew the process of regulation, recall that policies
are proposed sequentially. The presence of an influential media outlet transforms the
policy-making stage in a sort of sequential rock-paper-scissors game where a moderate
policy beats a populist one, a biased policy beats a moderate one, and a populist policy
beats a biased one. Given the incumbent’s proposal, the challenger has the second-mover
advantage of choosing the most profitable strategy between seeking the voter’s approval
or the media outlet’s support. When in charge of regulation, the incumbent can nullify
this “incumbency disadvantage effect” by setting low misreporting costs to force policy
convergence.7 Therefore, electoral incentives push politicians to use regulation for purely
instrumental reasons, decreasing the voter’s welfare as a result.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model, which I solve in Section 4. In Section 5, I
analyze the voter’s welfare and the process of regulation. In Section 6, I discuss the model
and its extensions, and Section 7 concludes. Formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature studying the political economy of media bias.8 Papers
belonging to this literature can be broadly split into two strands: models of demand-side
and models of supply-side media bias. The first strand focuses on the case where news
organizations are profit-maximizing and/or their preferences over political outcomes are
second-order. Bias can emerge, for example, when media firms and journalists want to
develop a reputation for accurate reporting (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2016),
consumers favor confirmatory news (Bernhardt, Krasa, & Polborn, 2008; Mullainathan &
Shleifer, 2005), or voters demand biased information (Calvert, 1985; Oliveros & Várdy,
2015; Suen, 2004). In the present paper I take a supply-side approach by considering a
media outlet that has preferences over political outcomes. In this second strand, bias
originates from the intrinsic preferences and motivations of agents who work for news
organizations, like editors and owners. For example, media bias occurs when journalists
7There is empirical evidence of both media’s anti-incumbent behavior (Puglisi, 2011) and of an
“incumbency disadvantage” effect due to media coverage (Green-Pedersen, Mortensen, & Thesen, 2017).
However, evidence is mixed as other work finds that media has either no clear effect (Gentzkow, Shapiro, &
Sinkinson, 2011) or a positive effect on the reelection chances of incumbent politicians (Drago, Nannicini,
& Sobbrio, 2014).
8For comprehensive surveys on the topic, see Prat and Strömberg (2013) and Gentzkow, Shapiro, and
Stone (2015).
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have ideological leanings (Baron, 2006), media firms suppress unwelcome news (Anderson
& McLaren, 2012; Besley & Prat, 2006), or politicians design public signals (Alonso &
Camara, 2016).
The above-mentioned papers abstract from the process of policy-making and political
competition. By contrast, I explicitly incorporate an electoral stage where candidates
compete via binding commitments to policy proposals. For this reason, the present paper
is more closely related to the stream of work studying the effects of political endorsements
on policy outcomes. Within this part of the literature but in contrast to the present
paper, G. Grossman and Helpman (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), and Chakraborty,
Ghosh, and Roy (2020) consider voters that are uncertain about their own preferences;
Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) model the source of
information about candidates as exogenous; Andina-Dı́az (2006) models voting behavior as
exogenous; Miura (2019) considers a media outlet that delivers fully certifiable information
about candidates’ policies; Chan and Suen (2008) and Strömberg (2004) study a demand-
side framework; Ashworth and Shotts (2010) and Warren (2012) use a political agency
framework to study how a media outlet affects the incumbent’s incentives to pander.
The most closely related paper is Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016). They use a
Downsian framework to study the welfare effects of a policy-motivated media outlet that
can influence voting behavior via cheap talk endorsements. The present paper is different
in three important aspects: first, I incorporate costs for misreporting information that are
proportional to the magnitude of misrepresentation. Under this approach, a news report is
more than just an endorsement as it constitutes a costly signal of the state (on this point,
see also the next paragraph). Second, I study a sequential rather than a simultaneous
model of electoral competition. As a result, I obtain that the policy of the incumbent is
subject to a different distortion than that of the challenger. I show that this difference
plays an important role when endogenizing the process of regulation. Finally, the welfare
analysis in Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) focuses on the ideological conflict between the
media outlet and the voter, while I focus on the intensity of misreporting costs and its
regulation.
The key feature of the present paper is how communication is modeled. Papers in the
previously mentioned literature consider media outlets that either can report anything
without bearing any direct consequence on their payoffs (e.g., Chakraborty & Ghosh,
2016; Gul & Pesendorfer, 2012) or cannot misreport information at all (e.g., Besley &
Prat, 2006; Duggan & Martinelli, 2011). By contrast, I consider a media outlet that can
misreport information but at a cost. In addition to incorporating a realistic feature, this
modeling strategy allows me to perform comparative statics on misreporting costs that
are currently unexplored, yet crucial for understanding the regulation of news markets.
Therefore, the present paper also touches upon the literature on strategic communi-
cation with lying costs (Chen, 2011; Kartik, 2009; Kartik, Ottaviani, & Squintani, 2007;
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Ottaviani & Squintani, 2006). With respect to this line of work, I consider a setting where
the voter (i.e., the receiver) has a binary action space and the outlet (i.e., the sender) has
a continuous message space. Moreover, the alternatives available to the voter are endoge-
nously selected through a process of electoral competition, and not exogenously given.
This framework gives rise to a number of important qualitative differences in the amount
of information transmitted and the language used in equilibrium: I obtain equilibria where
persuasion naturally occurs even within a large state space; the sender might invest costly
resources to misreport even in the (interim) absence of a conflict of interest with the
receiver; full information revelation occurs with relatively low misreporting costs.9 These
features are key and instrumental for the main results of the present paper.
3 The Model
There are four players: a representative voter v, a media outlet m, and two candidates: an
incumbent i, and a challenger c. The voter has to cast a ballot b ∈ {i, c} for one of the two
candidates. At the outset, in the “policy-making stage,” each candidate makes a binding
and public commitment to a policy proposal. I assume that proposals are sequential: the
incumbent first commits to a policy qi ∈ R; after observing qi, the challenger commits10 to
a policy qc ∈ R. Policy proposals q = (qi, qc) are then publicly observed by all players. If
the voter casts a ballot for candidate j ∈ {i, c}, then policy qj is eventually implemented.
The “communication subgame” takes place after the candidates’ commitments but
before the election: the media outlet privately observes the realization of a state θ ∈ Θ
and then delivers a news report r ∈ R. Reports are literal statements about the state.
Before casting a ballot, the voter observes the report r but not the state θ. Figure 1
illustrates the timing structure of the model.
The State. The state θ represents the relative quality of the incumbent with respect
to the challenger, and I shall hereafter refer to θ simply as “quality.” I assume that θ is
randomly drawn from a uniform density function f over Θ = [−φ, φ], where f is common
knowledge to all the players. Only the media outlet privately observes the realized θ. The
voter and the media outlet have identical preferences over quality: given any proposals
q = (qi, qc), the higher the quality is, the higher is the gain from the incumbent winning the
election rather than the challenger. Thus, quality is an element of vertical differentiation
9With a coarse action space, the outlet can achieve persuasion by pooling information to make the
voter indifferent between two actions. Similarly, Chen (2011) obtains “message clustering” in a setting
with a continuous action space and a coarse message space. Kartik (2009) finds partial separation in
a bounded type space setting. Kartik et al. (2007) and Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) show that full
separation is achieved when such a bound is arbitrarily large.
10The assumption of sequentiality in the policy-making process reflects that candidates announce their
policies at distinct points in time, and that the incumbent’s policy is typically formed or known before
the challenger’s. See, e.g., Wiseman (2006).
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i c m v
The incumbent com-
mits to policy qi
The challenger com-
mits to policy qc
The media outlet privately
observes θ and then
delivers a report r
The voter casts a ballot
b for either the incum-
bent or the challenger
Policy-making stage Communication subgame
Figure 1: Timeline of the model.
similar in kind to what is known in political theory as “valence.”11
Payoffs. Candidates are purely office-seeking, and care only about their own electoral
victory. I assume that candidates obtain a utility of 1 if they win and 0 otherwise. The
utility of candidate j ∈ {i, c} is thus12 uj(b) = 1{b = j}.
The voter and the media outlet have a preferred “bliss” policy of ϕv ∈ R and ϕm ∈ R
respectively.13 I assume without loss of generality that ϕm < ϕv, and denote with γ > 0
a parameter weighting the relative importance of policies to quality. The voter’s utility
uv(b, θ, q) from selecting candidate b ∈ {i, c} when quality is θ and proposals are q = (qi, qc)
is an additively separable combination of standard single-peaked policy preferences and
quality, i.e.,
uv(b, θ, q) = −γ(ϕv − qb)2 + 1{b = i}θ.
Therefore, given proposals q, the voter prefers to vote for the incumbent only if quality is
high enough, i.e., θ > τv(q) = γ(2ϕv − qc − qi)(qc − qi). The threshold τv(q) is obtained
from solving uv(i, θ, q) = uv(c, θ, q) for θ.
I similarly define τm(q) = γ(2ϕm − qc − qi)(qc − qi) and refer to τj(q) as player j’s
11Quality can capture traits like a candidate’s fit with the state of the world, competence, reputation,
evidence of good and bad conduct, etc. For a discussion of the closely related notion of valence or
character, see, e.g., Stokes (1963), Kartik and McAfee (2007), and Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016).
12
1{·} is the indicator function, where 1{A} = 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise.
13The model can allow for the presence of a finite committee or a continuum of voters where v is the
median voter with bliss policy ϕv. Under a majority voting rule with two alternatives, the assumption of
sincere voting is without loss of generality, as in such cases truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
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i if θ > τm(q)
c otherwise.
I denote by k > 0 a scalar parameter measuring the intensity of misreporting costs, and by
ξ > 0 the outlet’s gains from endorsing the candidate that ends up winning the election.15
The media outlet gets a utility of um(r, b, θ, q) when delivering report r in state θ with
proposals q and winning candidate b, where
um(r, b, θ, q) = 1{b = m̂(θ, q)}ξ − k(r − θ)2.
Unlike the voter, the outlet’s utility depends on whether the endorsed candidate m̂(θ, q)
is elected, but not on the implemented policy qb. This assumption allows me to model
a media outlet whose endorsements depend on the candidates’ policies even when the
policies do not directly affect the outlet’s payoff. This is often the case, for example, when
editors and journalists have political leanings on issues such as abortion or gay marriage
that have no direct impact on the media organization itself. The score ξ represents the
outlet’s benefits from endorsing the victorious rather than the defeated candidate. In
Section 6, I show that most qualitative results hold when considering political gains that
depend on policies q and bliss ϕm in a similar way as the voter’s.
In addition, the media outlet incurs a cost of k(r − θ)2 for delivering a news report
r when the state is θ. Any report r ∈ R has the literal or exogenous meaning “quality
is equal to r.” Truthful reporting occurs when r = θ, and it is assumed to be costless.
By contrast, misreporting information is costly, and the associated costs are increasing
with the difference between the stated and the true realization of quality. The score k
encapsulates all those elements determining the magnitude of misreporting costs, such
as reputation concerns, resources required for misrepresenting information and falsifying
numbers, and the stringency of fake news laws. With some abuse of language, I will
hereafter interchangeably refer to k as “misreporting costs” or “costs’ intensity.”16
Influential News. The media outlet is influential only if the voter’s sequentially
rational decision is not constant along the equilibrium path. To ensure that the outlet
14More precisely, m̂(θ, q) is the outlet’s preferred candidate given policies q and state θ. Since in
equilibrium the outlet will endorse her preferred candidate, I refer to m̂(·) as the “endorsed candidate.”
15Alternatively, ξ may indicate the avoided losses that the outlet would expect to incur when opposing
the winning candidate. For example, after the publication of the first stories about the Watergate scandal,
President Nixon allegedly said “The Post is going to have damnable, damnable problems out of this
one. They have a television station. . . . and they’re going to have to get it renewed.” See references in
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008, p. 136).
16I use the quadratic loss k(r− θ)2 to obtain a closed-form solution and to simplify exposition. To find
the equilibria of the communication subgame (Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.1), I use a more general
cost function kC(r, θ).
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is influential, I assume that the state space is relatively large, i.e., φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm)2.
Intuitively, a larger state space implies more uncertainty over quality and thus a more
prominent role for an informed outlet. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that
in equilibrium the outlet is influential and that candidates cannot gain from proposing
policies that make the outlet superfluous.17
Strategies and Equilibrium. A strategy for the incumbent is a binding commitment
to a policy proposal qi ∈ R; a strategy for the challenger is a function qc : R → R that
assigns a policy qc ∈ R to each incumbent’s proposal qi. I assume that candidates cannot
condition their proposals on the state or on the outlet’s reports.18 A reporting strategy for
the media outlet is a function ρ : Θ×R2 → R that associates a news report r ∈ R to every
tuple of proposals q ∈ R2 and quality θ ∈ Θ. I say that a report r is off-path if, given
strategy ρ(·), r will not be observed by the voter. Otherwise, I say that r is on-path. A
belief function for the voter is a mapping p : R× R2 → ∆(Θ) that, given any news report
r ∈ R and policies q ∈ R2, generates posterior beliefs p(θ|r, q), where p(·) is a probability
density function. Given a report r and posterior beliefs p(θ|r, q), the voter casts a ballot
for a candidate in the sequentially rational set β(r, q) = argmaxb∈{i,c} Ep[uv(b, θ, q) | r].
The solution concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), refined by the Intuitive
Criterion (Cho & Kreps, 1987).19 For most of the analysis, I focus on the sender-preferred
equilibrium defined as follows: when the voter is indifferent between the two candidates
at a given belief, she selects the one endorsed by the media outlet; when a candidate is
indifferent between some proposals, she advances the policy closest to the outlet’s bliss
ϕm. Given the potential conflict of interest between the voter and the media outlet, the
sender-preferred equilibrium is also the least preferred by the voter. The focus on this type
of equilibrium provides a useful benchmark consisting of the voter’s worst-case scenario,
which is key for the robust-control approach to policy analysis (Hansen & Sargent, 2008).
Moreover, it selects the unique perfect sequential equilibrium (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986)
of the communication subgame. I hereafter refer to a sender-preferred PBE robust to the
Intuitive Criterion simply as “equilibrium.”
Discussion and Extensions. Most qualitative findings are robust to the model’s
specifications. Section 6 looks at several variations of the baseline model as robustness
checks. These include the cases of a purely ideological media outlet and simultaneous
policy-making, among others. There, I also discuss the suitability of the equilibrium
concept, and various assumptions on the information and cost structure.
17See Corollary A.1 in Appendix A.2.2.
18This assumption is in line with the idea that all uncertainty about quality is publicly resolved only
after policy implementation, and policies cannot be easily changed in the short run. Moreover, candidates
cannot credibly and profitably condition their proposals on the media outlet’s reports.
19For a textbook definition of PBE and Intuitive Criterion, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). A formal




the outlet endorses c the outlet endorses i
the voter prefers c the voter prefers i
conflict of interest
Figure 2: The media outlet and the voter’s favorite candidate for different levels of quality. The
states in which there is a conflict of interest are highlighted in gray.
4 Equilibrium
I present the main equilibrium analysis in two parts: in Section 4.1, I begin by solving
for the equilibrium of the final communication subgame where, given any fixed pair
of policies, the media outlet delivers to the voter a news report about the candidates’
quality. In Section 4.2 I proceed by studying the equilibrium of the policy-making stage,
where candidates sequentially commit to policy proposals. Formal proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2.
4.1 The Communication Subgame
The communication subgame takes place after both candidates commit to policy proposals.
The media outlet privately observes the candidates’ relative quality θ and then delivers a
news report r consisting of a literal statement about θ. The voter, after observing the
outlet’s report but not the candidates’ quality, casts a ballot for either the incumbent or
the challenger. For convenience, I denote the communication subgame by Γ̂.
Given proposals q, the media outlet has a conflict of interest with the voter when
quality is between the thresholds τj(q), j ∈ {m, v}. Consider for example the case where
policies q are such that20 τm(q) > τv(q). When θ > τm(q) (resp. θ < τv(q)), the voter and
the outlet both agree that the best candidate is the incumbent (resp. the challenger). By
contrast, when θ ∈ (τv(q), τm(q)) the voter prefers the incumbent while the outlet endorses
the challenger. Since the voter cannot observe the realized quality, she is uncertain about
whether a conflict of interest exists or not. Figure 2 illustrates the preferred candidate of
the media outlet and the voter across different states and for the case τm(q) > τv(q).
The media outlet can misreport its private information about quality so as to induce
the election of its endorsed candidate m̂(q, θ) and seize the gains ξ. Denote by Θ̂(q) the
set of states that lie strictly between the thresholds τj(q), j ∈ {m, v}. If the media outlet
20We have that τm(q) > τv(q) when qc < qi, τm(q) < τv(q) when qc > qi, and τm(q) = τv(q) when
qc = qi. In the latter case, there is no conflict of interest between the media outlet and the voter.
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delivers a report that induces the election of its endorsed candidate when there is a conflict
of interest, then I say that persuasion has occurred.
Definition 1 (Persuasion). The media outlet persuades the voter if β(ρ(θ, q), q) = m̂(θ, q)
for some θ ∈ Θ̂(q) = (min {τv(q), τm(q)} ,max {τv(q), τm(q)}).
Since misreporting is costly, there is a limit to the reports that the outlet can profitably
deliver in a certain state, and thus different reports each carry a different informational
content that is not arbitrarily determined by the voter’s strategic inference.21 Consider a
news report, r > τm(q), indicating that quality is sufficiently high for the outlet to endorse
the incumbent. Suppose now that r leads to the electoral victory of the outlet’s endorsed
candidate, β(r, q) = i. I define the “lowest misreporting type” l(r) as the highest state22
θ in which the outlet does not find it strictly profitable to deliver the news report r. More










In equilibrium, the voter understands that such a report r could not be profitably delivered
if quality is lower than l(r), and should accordingly place probability zero on every θ < l(r).
I similarly define the “highest misreporting type” h(r) as the lowest state in which the
outlet does not find it strictly profitable to deliver a news report r < τm(q) such that










I can now present the main result of this section: in the equilibrium of the communi-
cation subgame Γ̂, the media outlet “jams” information by delivering the same pooling
report r∗(q) whenever quality takes values around the voter’s threshold τv(q). Otherwise,
when quality is relatively far from τv(q), the outlet always reports truthfully. When
observing the pooling report r∗(q), the voter ’s expectation about quality is exactly τv(q),
and therefore she is indifferent between the two candidates.23 This result helps us to find
the candidates’ equilibrium probability of electoral victory given any pair of proposals q.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂ is a pair (ρ(θ, q), p(θ|r, q))
such that, given policy proposals24 q,
21As it is the case, for example, in cheap talk games.
22In the jargon commonly used in signaling games, the state is also referred to as the “type” of sender.
23In the sender-preferred equilibrium, the voter selects the candidate endorsed by the media outlet
when indifferent. Therefore, the voter never mixes.
24Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ, q) due to the media outlet being indifferent between reporting
l(r∗(q)) and r∗(q) (resp. h(r∗(q)) and r∗(q)) when the state is θ = l(r∗(q)) > τm(q) and τm(q) < τv(q)
(resp. θ = h(r∗(q)) < τm(q) and τm(q) > τv(q)).
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if θ ∈ (r∗(q), h(r∗(q)))
θ otherwise.















if θ ∈ (l (r∗(q)) , r∗(q))
θ otherwise.
iii) If τv(q) = τm(q), then ρ(θ, q) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
iv) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r, q) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep[θ |r∗(q)] = τv(q), Ep[θ |r] < τv(q) for every off-path r, and p(θ|r, q) is
degenerate at θ = r otherwise.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 1, consider the case where proposals q are
such that τv(q) < τm(q), and suppose that there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in
truthful strategies, where ρ(θ, q) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ. When quality is slightly higher
than the voter’s threshold τv(q), the media outlet can deliver some report r ≤ τv(q) such
that the incurred misreporting costs are lower than the gains obtained from endorsing the
winning candidate, i.e., k(r − θ)2 < ξ. Given the truthful reporting rule ρ(θ, q), the voter
takes the outlet’s reports at face value, and thus casts a ballot for the challenger after
observing any r ≤ τv(q). The outlet has a strictly profitable deviation, implying that in
equilibrium there must be misreporting in some state.
Misreporting is a costly activity, and therefore the media outlet misreports only if
doing so induces the electoral victory of its endorsed candidate m̂(θ, q). Moreover, if it is
profitable for the outlet to deliver a report r′ < τm(q) when quality is θ
′ ∈ (r′, τm(q)), then
reporting r′ must be profitable for all θ ∈ [r′, θ′]. This suggests that in equilibrium the
outlet “pools” information about quality by delivering the same report r∗(q) for different
states in a convex set S(r∗(q)) such that m̂(θ′, q) = m̂(θ′′, q) for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ S(r∗(q)).
Upon observing the pooling report r∗(q), the voter infers that the realized quality is
in the set S(r∗(q)). If the voter’s expectation about quality Ep[θ|r∗(q)] is greater than
her threshold τv(q), then she casts a ballot for the incumbent; otherwise she votes for the
challenger. Therefore, by pooling states around τv(q) in a way such that Ep[θ|r∗(q)] ≤ τv(q),
the outlet can induce the election of the challenger even when quality is such that the
voter’s preferred candidate is the incumbent. That is, the outlet can achieve persuasion
by pooling information about quality.
The candidate endorsed by the media outlet is more likely to be elected when the
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pooling report r∗(q) makes the voter just indifferent between casting a ballot for the
incumbent and the challenger: pooling reports that induce lower expectations have the
same effect on the voter’s choice but are more expensive to deliver when there is a conflict
of interest. Therefore, in equilibrium the outlet misreports by delivering a pooling report
r∗(q) that jams states around the voter’s threshold in a way such that Ep[θ|r∗(q)] = τv(q).
This kind of pooling strategy prescribes the outlet to misreport even in states where
there is no conflict of interest. Even though at first it might seem counterintuitive, this
reporting behavior is consistent with strategic skepticism: the voter, being aware of the
media outlet’s leaning and misreporting technology, demands sufficiently strong evidence
that quality is low enough for the challenger to be elected. Therefore, when quality is
just slightly below τv(q), the outlet must nevertheless misreport to overcome the voter’s
skepticism.
By contrast, truthful reporting always occurs when quality takes extreme values that
are relatively far from the voter’s threshold τv(q). There are two possibilities in this
case: either there is a conflict of interest, or the interests of the outlet and the voter are
aligned. In the former case, misreporting is not convenient for the outlet as it would be
prohibitively costly to deliver a report that induces the election of its endorsed candidate.
In the latter case, the outlet does not need to misreport because the true realization of
quality is a sufficiently discriminating signal for the voter be trustful.
Lemma 1 shows that, given proposals q, the media outlet persuades the voter when
θ ∈ (τv(q), h(r∗(q))) if τv(q) < τm(q) and when θ ∈ (l(r∗(q)), τv(q)) if τv(q) > τm(q). If
τv(q) = τm(q), then there cannot be persuasion since the outlet and the voter always agree
on which candidate is best. By contrast, I say that the outlet exerts “full persuasion” if
persuasion occurs in every state in which there is a conflict of interest.
Definition 2 (Full persuasion). The media outlet exerts full persuasion if β(ρ(θ, q), q) =
m̂(θ, q) for all θ ∈ Θ̂(q).
The media outlet has fully persuasive power if, given policy proposals q, the misre-
porting costs k are low enough to make persuasion affordable in every state where there









Alternatively, the outlet exerts full persuasion if, given misreporting costs k, the proposals
qi and qc are sufficiently close to each other. Intuitively, as candidates’ policies become
more similar, the preferences of the voter and the outlet become more aligned, and the set
of states in which there is a conflict of interest becomes smaller. Since the outlet’s potential
25The cost threshold k̂(q) is obtained by setting h(r∗(q)) = τm(q) for τv(q) < τm(q) or l(r
∗(q)) = τm(q)
for τv(q) > τm(q), where r
∗(q) is defined as in Lemma 1.
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gains ξ are fixed, the share of states in which persuasion occurs under a conflict of interest
increases as proposals get closer. If policies are sufficiently similar, then persuasion occurs
every time there is a conflict of interest. Formally, there is full persuasion when proposals
q are such that




Figure 3 shows the equilibrium reporting rule of Lemma 1 for different policies and
misreporting costs. In panel (a), the outlet is more likely than the voter to prefer the
challenger and misreporting costs are relatively high. In this case, the media outlet
discredits the incumbent by delivering a report that “belittles” realizations of quality
around the voter’s threshold τv(q). With this strategy, the outlet achieves persuasion
in those states that are highlighted in light gray. By contrast, truthful reporting occurs
despite a conflict of interest in states that are highlighted in dark gray: in these cases,
persuasion is prohibitively expensive because of the relatively high misreporting costs
k > k̂(q). In states that are highlighted in gray, the outlet spends resources to misreport
information even though no conflict of interest is in place. These “white lies” are the
result of the voter’s skepticism about news reports that are not sufficiently discriminatory.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the equilibrium reporting rule when the outlet is more
likely than the voter to prefer the incumbent and misreporting costs are relatively low. In
this case, the media outlet supports the incumbent by delivering reports that “exaggerate”
realizations of quality26 around the voter’s threshold τv(q). Low misreporting costs allow
the outlet to exert full persuasion and induce the election of its endorsed candidate every
time there is a conflict of interest. As before, states in which the outlet delivers white lies
are highlighted in gray, while states in which the outlet persuades the voter are in light
gray.
4.2 The Policy-making Stage
Consider now the policy-making stage, where candidates sequentially make a binding
commitment to a policy proposal. Since candidates are purely office-seeking, they advance
policies to maximize their chances of getting elected. The result in the previous section is
key for finding the candidates’ equilibrium proposals: Lemma 1 shows the media outlet’s
equilibrium reporting rule and thus pins down the candidates’ probability of electoral
victory given any pair of policies q.
I denote by q∗i (k) the equilibrium policy advanced by the incumbent and by q
∗
c (qi, k)
the challenger’s best response to some proposal qi. I refer to policies that are relatively
close to the voter’s bliss ϕv as “populist” and to policies that are relatively close to
26There are perfect Bayesian equilibria in the communication subgame Γ̂ where the outlet supports the
incumbent (resp. challenger) by delivering a report that is lower (resp. higher) than the actual realization













(b) τv(q) > τm(q) and 0 < k ≤ k̂(q).
Figure 3: The two panels illustrate the equilibrium reporting rule for different levels of misreport-
ing costs and ordering of policy proposals. The states in which persuasion occurs are highlighted
in light gray. The states in which the outlet misreports even though there is no conflict of
interest are highlighted in gray. The states in which the outlet reveals the true realization of
quality even though there is a conflict of interest are highlighted in dark gray.
the outlet’s bliss ϕm as “biased.” The next result establishes the equilibrium proposals




i (k), k)) as a function of the misreporting costs’ intensity k.






































if k > k̄




where the misreporting costs threshold is k̄ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
.
In equilibrium, proposals are weakly increasing in k and strictly increasing for every
finite27 k > k̄ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
. When the costs of misreporting information are relatively low,




, both candidates advance the media outlet’s bliss policy ϕm. Thus,




leave the equilibrium policies unaltered. For











, while the challenger keeps offering the outlet’s bliss ϕm. Thus,
27The threshold k̄ is the highest intensity of misreporting costs such that the challenger best responds
with ϕm when undercutting the incumbent’s proposal.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium policy proposals for different intensities of misreporting costs. As k grows
arbitrarily large, both proposals monotonically converge to ϕv.




generates policy divergence. When the costs of
misreporting are relatively high, k > k̄, the challenger proposes less biased policies as well.
As k grows arbitrarily large, both proposals converge to the voter’s preferred policy ϕv,




i (k), k) for every finite
28 k > k̄/4. Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium
policy proposals for different levels of misreporting costs’ intensity k.
Here I discuss the intuition behind Proposition 1. Since policies outside the set [ϕm, ϕv]
are always dominated, I restrict attention29 to qj ∈ [ϕm, ϕv], j ∈ {i, c}. First, consider the
challenger’s problem of best responding to the incumbent’s proposal. When the incumbent
proposes a relatively populist policy, the challenger’s best response is to “undercut” the
incumbent with the most biased policy qc < qi that endows the media outlet with fully
persuasive power.30 With this strategy, the challenger maximizes both the extent of the
conflict of interest (τm(q), τv(q)) and the probability of receiving the outlet’s support,
subject to the outlet exerting full persuasion. Even though the challenger’s best response
is less appealing to the voter, the loss in “popular appeal” is more than compensated by
the outlet’s ability to persuade the voter over a large set of contingencies. By contrast,
offering a more populist policy qc > qi would make the challenger slightly more appealing
to the voter at the expense of getting the incumbent into the good graces of a fully
persuasive media outlet. Thus, offering any qc > qi is suboptimal in this case.
When the incumbent proposes relatively biased policies and misreporting costs are
sufficiently high, the best response of the challenger is to offer the voter’s bliss ϕv. This
28Equilibrium proposals are continuous in k as limk→k̄+ q
∗
i (k) = limk→k̄− q
∗







i (k), k) = ϕm.
29The focus on policies in the set [ϕm, ϕv] is without loss of generality: for both candidates j ∈ {i, c},
proposals qj > ϕv (resp. qj < ϕm) are dominated by every q
′
j ∈ [ϕv, qj) (resp. q′j ∈ (qj , ϕm]) as any such
q′j is more appealing to both the voter and the outlet.








Figure 5: The challenger’s best response for different intensities of misreporting costs. The best










strategy generates a large conflict of interest Θ̂(q) = (τm(q), τv(q)) such that the voter
requires evidence that quality is exceptionally high in order to vote for the incumbent.
The outlet is now more likely to endorse the incumbent than the challenger but, because
of high misreporting costs and a sharp policy divergence, it cannot exert full persuasion.
In this case, offering the voter’s bliss ϕv is the challenger’s best response because it leaves
the incumbent with an unpopular policy and the support of a weakened media outlet.
Similarly, when the incumbent’s policy is relatively biased but misreporting costs are
sufficiently low, the challenger’s best response remains that of undercutting the incumbent.
The strategy of proposing the voter’s bliss now backfires because with a low intensity
of misreporting costs the media outlet retains its ability to persuade the voter in a
relatively large share of Θ̂(q). If the costs’ intensity k is low enough, then the challenger’s
best response is to undercut the proposal of the incumbent to the point of offering the
outlet’s bliss ϕm. Figure 5 shows the challenger’s best response for different intensities of
misreporting costs.31
Consider now the incumbent’s problem of selecting a policy that maximizes her
probability of electoral victory, and suppose first that the intensity of misreporting costs
is relatively high, k > k̄/4. In this case, the optimal proposal of the incumbent q∗i (k) is
the policy that makes the challenger indifferent whether to best reply with the voter’s
bliss or with a relatively more biased policy (i.e., by undercutting the incumbent): higher
proposals qi > q
∗
i (k) would allow the challenger to get the support of a fully persuasive
outlet; lower proposals qi < q
∗
i (k) would be highly unpopular in comparison with the
challenger’s best response of offering the voter’s bliss. By contrast, when the intensity of




, the media outlet exerts full persuasion
31Proposition A.2 in Appendix A.2.1 shows the challenger’s best response function.
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for any combination of candidates’ proposals q ∈ [ϕm, ϕv]2. In this case, the incumbent’s
optimal policy is to offer the outlet’s bliss, as any higher proposal qi > ϕm would allow
the challenger to get the support of a fully persuasive media outlet by undercutting32 qi.
The presence of a persuasive media outlet generates a distortion in the process of
policy-making. Since candidates look to gain both the consensus of the voter and the
support of the influential outlet, their proposals drift away from the voter’s preferred policy,
breaking down the centripetal force of the median voter theorem (Black, 1948; Downs,
1957). This distortion peaks when the intensity of misreporting costs is sufficiently low so
that both candidates advance the media outlet’s bliss policy. In this case, persuasion never
takes place since there is no conflict of interest when candidates’ proposals are identical
(see Lemma 1). Therefore, with lower (resp. higher) intensities of misreporting costs the
voter might have worse (resp. better) policies but more (resp. less) information about
quality. In the next section, I study this trade-off in relation to the voter’s welfare.
5 Welfare and Regulation
Having characterized the equilibrium of the communication subgame (Lemma 1 in Sec-
tion 4.1) and the candidates’ equilibrium proposals (Proposition 1 in Section 4.2), I now
proceed to study their welfare implications. I denote by W ∗v (k) the voter’s equilibrium
expected utility and refer to W ∗v (k) simply as the voter’s welfare.
33 As a benchmark,
consider the voter’s expected utility under complete information, which I denote by Ŵv.
Suppose that the voter perfectly observes the realized quality after the policy-making
stage but before the election takes place. In this case, both candidates cannot do better
than offer the voter’s bliss policy as the media outlet would have no role. The candidate
with the highest relative quality is always elected and the voter’s favorite policy is always
implemented. Therefore, Ŵv = φ/4.
In Section 5.1, I study how the intensity of misreporting costs affects different de-
terminants of the voter’s welfare. In Section 5.2, I extend the main model by allowing
candidates to select the costs’ intensity ahead of the policy-making stage. Formal proofs
are relegated to Appendix A.3.
5.1 The Voter’s Welfare
Consider the problem of a regulator that seeks to maximize the welfare of the voter by
selecting the intensity of misreporting costs. This type of intervention can be performed,
32Notice that the model does not predict that the incumbent always takes a more populist position
than to the challenger. While this happens in the sender-preferred equilibrium, there are other equilibria
where the challenger goes fully populist by offering the voter’s favorite policy and the incumbent proposes
a relatively more biased policy. See Proposition A.2.
33See equation (4) in Appendix A.3 for an explicit formulation of W ∗v (k).
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for example, by issuing “fake news laws” or by subsidizing watchdogs that expose to
the public those media outlets that concoct news reports. As we have seen in the
previous section, the process of policy-making is strategically intertwined with the voter’s
informational environment. Interventions that change the misreporting costs might affect
both the amount of information received by the voter and the policies advanced by the
candidates.34 To maximize the voter’s welfare, it is crucial for regulators to understand
the consequences and the trade-offs involved in these types of interventions.
Before showing the next result, it is thus useful to note some important features of
the equilibria in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1. First, equilibrium policies q∗(k) satisfy
condition (1) for every finite k: on the equilibrium path, the media outlet always exerts
full persuasion and the candidate endorsed by the outlet, m̂(q∗(k), θ), is always elected.
Figure 6 shows the outlet’s reporting rule on the equilibrium path for some finite k > k̄/4.
Second, an increase in the misreporting costs’ intensity does not necessarily yield more
information to the voter. Intuitively, since the outlet exerts full persuasion, the larger
the conflict of interest Θ̂(q∗(k)), the less the information received by the voter. Recall
that the share of states in which there is a conflict of interest is directly proportional
to the difference between proposals.35 It follows that an increase in k yields more (resp.
less) information to the voter only if it generates policy convergence (resp. divergence).
However, Proposition 1 shows that the distance between equilibrium proposals is non-
monotonic36 in k. Hence, an increase in the misreporting costs’ intensity might decrease
the amount of information received by the voter in equilibrium. Third, with a relatively




, there is no conflict of interest because
equilibrium policies are identical. In this case, persuasion never occurs and the media
outlet fully reveals its private information about quality. By contrast, persuasion always
takes place with positive probability for every finite k > k̄/4. Therefore, in equilibrium
there is persuasion only if the misreporting costs’ intensity is sufficiently high.
Since an increase in the misreporting costs might yield the voter better policies at the
expense of selecting the best candidate with lower probability, it is not clear how this
type of intervention would affect the voter’s welfare. The next proposition clears up this
ambiguity by showing that increments in the costs’ intensity k never harm the voter.




, and strictly increasing in k for all finite k ≥ k̄/4. As k → ∞, W ∗v (k) → Ŵv.
Proposition 2 shows that even in those cases where an increase in k generates more
persuasion, the gain that the voter obtains from having better policies always overcomes
34The voter receives more (resp. less) information if, given the outlet’s reporting rule ρ(·), she casts a
ballot for her preferred candidate in more (resp. less) states.
35Formally, |Θ̂ (q∗(k)) | = 2γ(ϕv − ϕm) (q∗i (k) − q∗c (q∗i (k), k)).
















Figure 6: The media outlet’s reporting rule on the equilibrium path for some finite costs’ intensity
k > k̄/4. The outlet exerts full persuasion and its endorsed candidate is always elected.
the expected loss in quality due to worse selection. Denote by χ(k) the ex-ante probability
that persuasion occurs, called the “persuasion rate.” From Proposition 1 and Lemma 1,




observed before, the media outlet is more likely to persuade the voter when the set of
states in which there is a conflict of interest Θ̂(q∗(k)) is larger. Figure 7 shows both the
voter’s welfare and the probability that persuasion occurs as a function of k.




: in this case, a marginal
increase in the costs’ intensity k generates policy divergence, more disagreement, and
thus a higher persuasion rate χ(k). As a consequence, the voter becomes increasingly
likely to cast a ballot for the wrong candidate. The expected loss in quality due to worse
selection is more than compensated by the availability of an increasingly populist policy
advanced by the incumbent: since the proposals of both candidates are heavily skewed
toward the media outlet’s preferred policy, the voter obtains an exceptionally high gain
from policies that, on average, are closer to her bliss. When k ≥ k̄, an increase in the
costs’ intensity generates proposals that are both more populist and closer to each other.
The resulting policy convergence reduces the conflict of interest, and thus the persuasion
rate χ(k) declines. In this case, the welfare of the voter increases because she obtains





a marginal increase in the costs’ intensity has no effect on equilibrium policies and thus
does not impact the voter’s welfare either. As a result, lenient measures can actually
decrease the voter’s welfare when taking into consideration the public resources required
to carry out the interventions.
The media outlet provides the voter with useful information about candidates’ quality,
but on the other hand it generates a policy distortion where proposals drift away from the
voter’s bliss. This trade-off reaches its peak when the intensity of misreporting costs is
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(a) The voter’s equilibrium welfare.
k / 4 k
k
0
χ ( k )
(b) The probability of persuasion in equilibrium.
Figure 7: The voter’s welfare increases with the intensity of misreporting costs even when higher
costs’ intensities leads to a higher persuasion rate. With relatively low intensities of misreporting
costs there is no persuasion but the voter’s welfare is at its minimum. As k grows arbitrarily
large, W ∗v (k) and χ(k) converge monotonically to Ŵv = φ/4 and zero, respectively.
relatively low: the media outlet fully reveals its private information about quality but the
proposals of both candidates collapse to the outlet’s preferred policy. If the quality of the
elected candidate is of little importance with respect to the implemented policy, then the
voter might be better off without the media outlet: in this case, both candidates would
pander to the uninformed voter by offering her preferred policy, and the voter would
randomly cast a ballot for one of the two candidates. The next result shows conditions
under which the voter is better off without the media outlet.
Corollary 1. If −γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4 < 0, then there exists a finite k′ > k̄/4 such that
the voter is strictly better off without media outlet for all k ∈ (0, k′).
Alternatively, the voter might be better off with a “pre-election silence” period that
forbids the delivery of policy-relevant news in the run-up to the election.37 Conditional
on the intensity of misreporting costs being low enough, the voter is better off without
the media outlet if: (i) γ is high enough, so that policies are much more important than
quality; (ii) the preferred policy of the voter and the media outlet are different enough;
i.e., there is a large ideological difference |ϕv −ϕm|; (iii) φ is small enough; that is, quality
has little impact on which candidate is best. By contrast, if the costs’ intensity is high
enough, then the presence of the media outlet always benefits the voter. Corollary 1 is
complementary to the similar findings of Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) in a cheap talk
setting, Alonso and Camara (2016) in a Bayesian persuasion framework, and Boleslavsky
and Cotton (2015) for a non-strategic and exogenous media outlet.
37Several countries operate an “election silence” period where no campaigning, polling, or endorsement
of candidates is allowed in the period preceding a general or presidential election.
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5.2 Endogenous Regulation
In the previous section, Proposition 2 suggests that a regulator concerned about the
voter’s welfare should implement an intensity of misreporting costs that is as high as
possible. However, regulation is often performed by actors that are neither fully detached
from the political process nor have interests that are perfectly aligned with those of voters.
In fact, “fake news laws” are mostly promulgated and discussed in parliaments where the
incumbent government has substantial decisive and legislative power.38 I first discuss the
case where the incumbent candidate selects the intensity of misreporting costs.
Consider the following extension of the main model: ahead of the policy-making stage,
the incumbent sets costs’ intensity ki > 0, which is publicly observed and cannot be
changed in the short run. Then, the game proceeds as described in Section 3. The
incumbent, being purely office-seeking, selects ki to maximize her chances of electoral
victory. From the previous analysis, we obtain that in equilibrium the incumbent wins
the election with probability ι(k) = φ−τm(q
∗(k))
2φ
. I denote by k∗i the costs’ intensity that
maximizes ι(k). The next result shows that the incumbent candidate would select a costs’
intensity that is relatively low.









To see the intuition behind this result, recall that the sequential nature of the policy-
making process allows the challenger to offer policies that are more appealing to the
media outlet relative to those offered by the incumbent (Proposition 1). By obtaining the
outlet’s support, the challenger enjoys a second-mover advantage as she becomes more
likely to be elected than the incumbent.39 Figure 8 shows that the incumbent’s probability
of electoral victory is less than a half for all finite k > k̄/4. Lemma 2 shows that, when in
charge of regulation, the incumbent eliminates the challenger’s second-mover advantage
by setting relatively low misreporting costs to force policy-convergence: when candidates
advance the same policy, the media outlet never engages in misreporting, and thus the
challenger cannot benefit from the outlet’s support. Any higher intensity of misreporting
costs would generate policy divergence and thus a conflict of interest that would benefit
the challenger at the expense of the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory.
Lemma 2 casts a negative light on the process of regulation. From the voter’s
viewpoint, the incumbent could not select a worse costs’ intensity: even though k∗i is
such that misreporting and persuasion never take place, the induced policy distortion
is maximized and the voter’s welfare is at its minimum. The resulting outcome is as
38Funke and Famini (2018) provide a comprehensive list of measures recently taken by governments
against online misinformation.
39The incumbency disadvantage effect that is behind the result in Lemma 2 is present also in equilibria
that are non-sender-preferred. By definition, ι(k) is the same even when the challenger does not break
indifference in favor of the media outlet.
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if the media outlet could directly decide upon which candidate gets elected and which
policy is implemented. Moreover, for such a low intensity of misreporting costs k∗i the
voter might be better off without the media outlet at all (Corollary 1). The situation
is better, but still far from ideal, when the challenger is in charge of selecting the costs’
intensity: in this case, the challenger maximizes her chances of electoral victory by selecting
k∗c = argmink∈R+ ι(k) > k̄. This level of costs’ intensity generates policy divergence and
thus a positive persuasion rate χ(k). However, the voter is better off with k∗c than with k
∗
i
because of a reduction in policy distortion. As long as candidates have an influence over
the regulatory process, their office-seeking motivation results in a pull for implementing
costs’ intensities that are lower than the voter’s optimal.
Lemma 2 also shows that the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory gets close





, the incumbent deliberately compromises the voter’s welfare in order to
increase her chances of winning just by an arbitrarily small amount. This strategy
is arguably unappealing to voters, and it would be fair to assume that such behavior
might eventually backfire with a substantial drop of consensus. On the other hand,
interventions that impose arbitrarily high misreporting costs might be frowned upon if
their implementation costs are large or when such stringency is perceived as a potential
threat to freedom of speech. To incorporate these realistic elements in the present analysis,
consider the following alternative extension: the voter has a preferred costs’ intensity kv
that is relatively high but finite, kv ≥ k∗c ; the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory
is ι̂(ki) = ι(ki) + ν(ki), where ν(·) indicates how the incumbent’s choice of ki affects her
chances of winning the election. Suppose that ν(·) is maximized for ki = kv, continuously
differentiable in ki, and ν(k
′) > ν(k′′) for all k′, k′′ such that |kv − k′| < |kv − k′′|. For
concreteness, say that ν(ki) = y + x · φ(ki; kv, σ), where y ∈ R, x > 0, and φ(k; kv, σ)
is the probability density function of a normal distribution with mean kv and standard
deviation40 σ. Even though I do not endogenize the mechanism through which the
candidates’ probability of victory is affected by the process of regulation, this alternative
extension can offer some additional insights. When the choice of ki does not affect much
the incumbent’s chances of victory (i.e., when x is low and σ is high), the incumbent
selects k∗i ≈ k̄/4 as in the baseline extension; otherwise, the incumbent’s optimal choice
is even higher41 than the costs’ intensity preferred by the voter, i.e., k∗i > kv. Figure 8
provides two graphical examples of this additional extension.
The above analysis suggests that if an electorate is highly concerned and responsive
40Clearly, parameters y, x, and σ must respect ι̂(ki) ∈ [0, 1] for every ki > 0.






= 0 and ∂ι(ki)∂ki > 0 for all ki > kv ≥ k
∗
c .
When setting an intensity of misreporting costs that is marginally higher than kv, the incumbent increases
her chances of victory by inducing more similar policies and thus reducing the conflict of interest and
persuasion. For a similar reason, in this case the challenger would select an intensity of misreporting
costs that is still lower than kv.
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Figure 8: The incumbent’s probability of electoral victory for different choices of costs’ intensity.
The black line represents ι(k), while the dashed and dotted lines represent ι̂(k) = ι(k) + ν(k),
where ν(k) = −.006 + .2 · φ(k; kv, σ). In the dotted line, φ(·) has a standard deviation of σ = 6
and ι̂(k) has a global maximum at k∗ ≈ 10.5 > kv = 10; in the dashed line, φ(·) has a standard
deviation of σ = 8 and ι̂(k) has a global maximum at k∗ ≈ k̄/4 = .25 As the intensity of
misreporting costs k grows arbitrarily large, ι(k) monotonically converges to 1/2.
to the problem of “fake news,” then incumbent governments might push for extreme
and disproportionate interventions; otherwise, regulation might be overly lenient. This
result seems to fit with the dual reaction to recent efforts made by governments against
fake news and misinformation. In some countries there is a growing consensus that
governments’ efforts are insufficient. With regards to the US, “calls for regulation without
censorship have been made by many people and many groups — it’s just that there is
simply no political will to make a real change” (Applebaum, 2018). On the other hand,
there is a concurrent concern that some interventions are excessively stringent and can
be exploited by governments for purely instrumental reasons. For example, the 2018
French anti-misinformation law endorsed by President Macron has received a pushback
from the opposition party based on the argument that the law falls short of the principle
of proportional justice. “As regards the French solution, there seems to be a clear risk
that an incumbent government constrains the freedom of expression of its opponents”
(Alemanno, 2018). Similarly, the German Network Enforcement Act (or NetzDG) has
been criticized by Reporters without Borders and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Opinion for violating the right to freedom of the press and endangering human rights.
The Act, which imposes fines of up to e50 million, has been recalled for revision because
too much news content was blocked. “Even the minister of justice – who helped author
the NetzDG – had his tweets censored” (Funke & Famini, 2018).
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6 Discussion and Extensions
In this section, I discuss some assumptions and extensions of the model to examine the
robustness of the results. Formal proofs are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix B.
Media Competition. A monopoly best describes those cases where media outlets
can have exclusive possession of policy-relevant news. Interventions that alter misreporting
costs may discipline these media outlets, whereas interventions that change concentration
levels do not. Whilst the analysis of a monopolistic news market is an important and
natural first step to study interventions that change misreporting costs, it would be
interesting to also study competitive environments. In Vaccari (2021), I extend the
analysis of the communication subgame (Section 4.1) to the case of two competing media
outlets that have common information and conflicting interests. The addition of a policy-
making stage in a competitive environment is a challenging task because candidates can
strategically create asymmetries in the conflict of interest between the media outlets and
the voter. In equilibrium, the voter allocates the burden of proof across outlets accounting
for their asymmetries. I leave the endeavor of endogenizing policy choices within a model
of communication with multiple media outlets for future research.
Political Gains. If ξ are resources that the winning candidate inefficiently allocate to
the media outlet as a reward for her endorsement, then we should take this into account
when calculating the voter’s welfare. Recall that, since equilibrium policies q∗(k) satisfy
condition (1) for every finite k, the media outlet always exerts full persuasion and the
candidate endorsed by the outlet is always elected. Therefore, we can simply subtract ξ
from the equilibrium welfare of the voter W ∗v , and all results would be unchanged.
Regulation Costs. In this paper, I abstract from regulation costs. However, carrying
out interventions typically comes at a cost that should be accounted for when computing
the voter’s welfare. Since results about welfare would be highly dependent from the
assumptions we make on regulation costs, I leave these costs out from the current
analysis.42 Intuitively, assuming sufficiently high regulation costs would break down the
monotonicity result in Proposition 2. However, as noted before, Proposition 2 implicitly
shows that lenient interventions are detrimental for the voter’s welfare when misreporting
costs k are sufficiently low. This take holds true as long as regulation costs are positive,
no matter their shape and how small they are.
Ideological Media. In the model presented in Section 3, the media outlet obtains
fixed policy-independent gains ξ > 0 when the candidate she endorses ends up winning
the election. Assuming fixed gains has two advantages: first, it simplifies the analysis and
allows us to obtain closed-form solutions; second, it is an adequate approach to model a
media organization that is ideologically biased (because, e.g., of the ownership or editor)
42Moreover, it is not clear which functional form would be more appropriate to describe regulation
costs. For example, interventions that decrease the costs’ intensity k may free up resources but they
would also require time and effort.
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but that is not affected by the candidates’ policies (such as, e.g., abortion laws or gay
marriage).43 However, it is interesting to consider a variant of the model where the media
outlet’s payoff is directly affected by the policies in a similar way as the voter’s. In this
case, the outlet’s gains from inducing the election of her favorite candidate depend on the
candidates’ policies q and the outlet’s bliss ϕm. I formally study this case in Appendix B.
Given the incumbent’s proposal qi, the challenger can still garner a second-mover
advantage by catering to the media outlet. Importantly, imitating the incumbent is
never a best reply as long as the misreporting costs are positive and finite. By contrast,
when k → +∞ both policies converge to the voter’s bliss ϕv, and when k → 0+ both
policies converge to ϕm. Therefore, as in the main analysis, policy divergence occurs for
intermediate levels of misreporting costs, and convergence occurs otherwise. This implies
that the qualitative results concerning policy distortion and the rate of persuasion carry
through even when the outlet’s gains are policy-dependent. Levels of misreporting costs
that are close to zero lead to large policy distortions but a small conflict between the
outlet and the media, and therefore less misreporting and persuasion. Higher misreporting
costs decrease the policy distortion but generate a larger conflict of interest, which yields
more misreporting and persuasion. Since equilibrium policies are now defined implicitly,
it is now more difficult to analyze the voter’s welfare, which I leave for future research.
Simultaneous Policy-making. I assume that candidates propose policies sequen-
tially. The sequential nature of the policy-making process is important as it shows that
the challenger enjoys a second-mover advantage. As a result, the incumbent can use regu-
lation to eliminate the challenger’s advantage at the expense of the voter. However, most
qualitative results hold even when candidates propose their policies simultaneously. In
Lemma B.3, I show that in this case policy convergence to (ϕm, ϕm) occurs when k ≤ k̄/4,
exactly as in the case where policy-making is sequential. Moreover, for intermediate
values of k the equilibrium of the policy-making stage must be in mixed strategies (see
Lemma B.4). This implies that for intermediate k policy divergence occurs with positive
probability.44 Finally, for k → +∞ we still obtain convergence to (ϕv, ϕv). Therefore,
the main qualitative results about policy distortions and the rate of persuasion hold even
when candidates propose their policies simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Equilibrium Selection. Conditions that ensure equilibrium uniqueness are important
to perform exercises of comparative statics. However, as it is typical in communication
games, here there is not a unique equilibrium. In this paper, I mainly focus on the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is robust to the Intuitive Criterion and preferred by the
43In these cases, an ideologically biased editor is budget constrained in that she cannot use more
resources than the fixed political gains ξ to misreport information. Moreover, the private gains that an
ideological editor or journalist obtains from policies are likely to be small or negligible next to the outlet’s
political gains ξ.
44In a similar setting with simultaneous policy proposals and cheap talk communication, Chakraborty
and Ghosh (2016) characterize the candidates’ mixed-strategy equilibrium for different levels of conflict
of interest between the media outlet and the voter.
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sender. There are several reasons why this is a sensible choice: first, the sender-preferred
equilibrium constitutes also the voter’s worse case scenario, which is key for the robust
approach to policy analysis (Hansen & Sargent, 2008); second, it is also the unique perfect
sequential equilibrium (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986); third, among the perfect Bayesian
equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion, the sender-preferred is the only one that is
undefeated (Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Postlewaite, 1993);45 finally, it is “intuitive” (Cho
& Kreps, 1987). Therefore, the analysis is centered on a focal and important equilibrium
that possesses a number of appealing qualities. In addition, the results about welfare
would carry through even if we were to consider the whole class of perfect Bayesian
equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion and focus on sets of equilibrium payoffs.46 In
Appendix A.1, I show all the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the communication subgame
that survive the Intuitive Criterion (Proposition A.1).
Tie-breaking Rule. The “sender-preferred” part of the equilibrium concept implies
that, when indifferent, the challenger best replies to the incumbent with a policy that
is closer to the outlet’s bliss ϕm. From Section 4.2 we know that when k ∈ (0, k̄/4) the
challenger strictly prefers to propose ϕm, while for finite k ≥ k̄/4 she is indifferent between
proposing the voter’s bliss ϕv or a biased policy. Therefore, the main qualitative result
would carry through even if the challenger were to break indifference in favor to the voter
rather than the media outlet: in this case, policy convergence occurs at k ∈ (0, k̄/4), and
then divergence occurs due to a discontinuity at k = k̄/4, where also the voter’s welfare and
the persuasion rate would jump to higher values. As k increases, the incumbent’s policy
becomes increasingly populist while the challenger keeps proposing ϕv. It follows that, as
k increases further, the voter’s welfare increases while the persuasion rate decreases.
Misreporting Costs. I assume that the media outlet incurs misreporting costs that
are continuously increasing with the size of the lie. This assumption is grounded on the
following observations: first, credibly reporting a gross distortion of the truth requires
more time and effort than reporting just a slight stretch of the truth; second, “bigger lies”
are more likely to be detected and also lead to a larger reputation loss. More discussion on
misreporting costs is provided by Kartik (2009) and Kartik et al. (2007), among others.
The use of continuous misreporting costs (and thus continuous report and state spaces)
is not only a sensible assumption, but it is also important for our qualitative findings. For
example, consider a discrete variant of the model with three states (high, medium, low)
and a fixed lying cost k > 0 that the outlet incurs when r 6= θ. In this case, small changes
in k would, in general, have no effect. When accounting for regulation costs, this implies
that lenient interventions necessarily damage the voter’s welfare. I show that this result
45See Lemmata B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.
46To see this, notice that the multiplicity of PBE in the communication subgame (Proposition A.1 in
Appendix A.1) yields a convex set W(k) of payoffs that the voter can obtain in equilibrium (Corollary B.1
in Appendix A.3). Since changes in the intensity of misreporting costs k affect only the lower bound of
W(k), the focus on the voter’s worst-case scenario is without loss of generality.
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is not a byproduct of having a discrete state space and fixed misreporting costs.
Information Structure. The distributional assumption on θ implies that, during
the policy-making stage, both the candidates and the voter have uninformative priors
about the candidates’ relative quality. Information about θ is revealed to the media outlet
only after the policy-making stage. There are two main interpretation of this information
structure: first, it is political parties that commit to policies and then nominate their own
candidates. The parties cannot acquire every piece of information about the nominees’
quality, which is often hidden on purpose; second, information about the candidates’
quality is publicly known, but it is not sure how their traits will advantage them in the
future. In this case, θ represents the state of the world in which the winning candidate
will have to operate. For more discussion about this type of information structure, see
Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016).
7 Conclusion
This article studies the voter’s welfare in relation to interventions that affect media outlets’
misreporting costs. The results provide a number of policy implications. As intuition
would suggest, interventions that increase the costs of misreporting information never
make the voter worse off. However, lenient regulatory efforts might be futile and thus
wasteful when accounting for their implementation costs. In these cases, a regulator should
either do nothing or enforce substantial measures. I provide conditions under which the
voter is better off without a media outlet or with a period of pre-election silence.
The presence of an influential and biased media outlet generates both policy and
informational distortions. As a result, higher misreporting costs might be associated
with more persuasion and a worse selection of candidates, but they can still increase the
voter’s welfare because of a reduction in policy distortions. Therefore, regulatory efforts
such as “fake news laws” ought not to be judged solely by their impact on misreporting
behavior. This type of intervention should not be designed with the objective of reducing or
eliminating misinformation: full revelation can be achieved with relatively low misreporting
costs, but the induced policy distortion would minimize the voter’s welfare.
Importantly, electoral incentives skew the process of regulation as politicians strategi-
cally choose interventions to maximize their own chances of electoral victory. For purely
instrumental reasons, the incumbent government deliberately pursues interventions that
minimize the voter’s welfare. These kind of friction in the regulatory process persists
even when the challenger is in charge of regulation and when the candidates’ probability
of electoral victory is affected in a reasonable way by which intervention they choose to
advance.
This paper is a first important step toward the development of a sensible theory of
regulation in news markets. I show that the process of regulation is problematic even
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when politicians have the option to implement an “ideal intervention” that maximizes the
voter’s welfare at no cost and without generating an additional agency problem. However,
as discussed at the end of Section 5, there is a widespread concern that fake news laws
might infringe free speech rights. It is often difficult to publicly assess and agree upon
what is the underlying “truth” behind news reports, and thus governments can use harsh
interventions to capture the media.47 Proceeding from this paper’s findings, the next step
is to take into consideration the possibility that regulation can be instrumentally used by
political actors to directly control information.48 I leave this for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 The Communication Subgame
The communication subgame Γ̂ starts after the policy-making stage, where both candidates
make binding commitments to policy proposals. In this section, I assume that the
proposed policies q = (qi, qc) are such that τm(q) < τv(q). Since policies are fixed, in
this section I simplify the notation by using τj ≡ τj(q), ρ(θ) ≡ ρ(θ, q), p(θ|r, q) ≡ p(θ|r),
and β(r) ≡ β(r, q). I use the term “generic equilibrium” to denote a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂ that is robust to the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho & Kreps, 1987). A “sender-preferred equilibrium” of the communication subgame Γ̂
is the generic equilibrium preferred by the media outlet, as defined in Section 3.
Proposition A.1 builds on Lemmata A.1 to A.5 and shows all the generic equilibria49
of Γ̂. The proofs of Proposition A.1 and of all its supporting lemmata use a general
misreporting cost function kC(r, θ), where k > 0 and C(·, ·) is continuous on R × Θ
with C(r, θ) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R and θ ∈ Θ, C(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Θ. The cost function
C(·) satisfies C(r, θ) > C(r′, θ) if |r − θ| > |r′ − θ| for all θ ∈ Θ, and C(r, θ) > C(r, θ′)
if |r − θ| > |r − θ′| for all r ∈ R. I redefine the functions l(r) and h(r) for a general
cost C(r, θ) as follows: for a r > τm, l(r) = max {τm,min {θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ}}; for a r <
τm, h(r) = min {τm,max {θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ}}. For consistency with the rest of the paper,
Proposition A.1 and Lemma 1 are expressed in terms of the cost function C(r, θ) = (r−θ)2.
47At the end of Section 5, I incorporate the idea that voters have a distaste for harsh interventions,
e.g., because of excessive implementation costs. Alternatively, voters might be afraid that the government
can exploit regulation to control information. However, I do not explicitly model the agency problem
between the regulator and the voter, and assume as exogenous the process by which the candidates’
probability of electoral victory is affected by their choice of regulation.
48For example, regulators might instrumentally punish a media outlet that delivers unwelcome news
on a false account of misinformation. Note that the type of intervention considered in the present paper
does not necessarily require an assessment of the media outlet’s private information. Measures such as
awareness campaigns aimed at informing people about misinformation and targeted educational programs
make it more difficult and thus more costly for news providers to credibly misreport information.
49A sufficient condition on the state space for the existence of all generic equilibria in Proposition A.1






. In this section I assume
that such a condition is always satisfied.
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The set of all the voter’s pure strategy best responses to a report r and posterior
beliefs p(·|r) such that
∫
θ∈T












Fix an equilibrium outcome and let u∗m(θ) denote the outlet’s expected equilibrium payoff









um(r, b, θ, q)
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.
An equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion refinement if there exists a state
θ′ ∈ Θ such that, for some report r′, u∗m(θ′) < minb∈B(J(r′),r′) um(r′, b, θ′, q).
In Lemma A.5, I use the following notation to denote the limits of the reporting rule
ρ(·) as θ approaches state t from, respectively, above and below: ρ+(t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and
ρ−(t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
Lemma A.1. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ < τm and θ > τm.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that there are two states θ′′ > θ′ > τm
such that ρ(θ′) > ρ(θ′′). We can rule out that β(ρ(θ′)) = β(ρ(θ′′)) = c, as in such case the
equilibrium would prescribe ρ(θ′) = θ′ < θ′′ = ρ(θ′′). If β(ρ(θ′)) = β(ρ(θ′′)) = i, then in at
least one of the two states θ′, θ′′ the outlet could profitably deviate by delivering the report
prescribed in the other state. Consider the case where β(ρ(θ′)) = i (c) and β(ρ(θ′′)) = c
(i). In equilibrium, it has to be that ρ(θ′′) = θ′′ (ρ(θ′) = θ′). Given ρ(θ′) > ρ(θ′′) = θ′′ > θ′
(θ′′ > θ′ = ρ(θ′) > ρ(θ′′)) and C(ρ(θ′), θ′′) < C(ρ(θ′), θ′) (C(ρ(θ′′), θ′′) > C(ρ(θ′′), θ′)),
the outlet could profitably deviate in state θ′′ (θ′) by reporting ρ(θ′) (ρ(θ′′)). A similar
argument applies for any two states θ′ < θ′′ < τm, completing the proof.
Lemma A.2. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, if ρ(θ) is strictly monotonic and continuous
in an open interval, then ρ(θ) = θ for all θ in such an interval.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that the reporting rule ρ(·) is strictly
increasing (decreasing) and continuous in an open interval (a, b), but ρ(θ) > θ for some
θ ∈ (a, b). There always exist an ǫ > 0 such that the media outlet prefers the same
alternative in both states θ and θ− ǫ, and θ < ρ(θ− ǫ) < ρ(θ) (resp. ρ(θ− ǫ) > ρ(θ) > θ).
The media outlet never pays misreporting costs to implement its least preferred alternative;
therefore, it must be that β(ρ(θ)) = β(ρ(θ − ǫ)). Since C(ρ(θ − ǫ), θ) < C(ρ(θ), θ) (resp.
C(ρ(θ), θ − ǫ) < C(ρ(θ − ǫ), θ − ǫ)), the media outlet has a profitable deviation in state θ
(resp. θ − ǫ), contradicting that ρ(·) is in equilibrium.
50For T = ∅, I set B(∅, r) = B(Θ, r).
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Lemma A.3. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τm.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that ρ(θ) 6= θ for all θ ∈ S, where S is
an open set such that supS ≤ τm and S ⊂ Θ. Beliefs must be such that β(r) = i for all
r ∈ S. Suppose that a report r′ ∈ S is off-path. It must be that u∗m(θ) ≥ um(r′, i, θ, q)
for all θ ≥ τm. Since sup J(r′) ≤ τm < τv and B(J(r′), r′) = c, the outlet can profitably
deviate by reporting truthfully when θ = r′ ∈ S. Hence, all reports r ∈ S must be on-path.
To have β(r′) = i for a r′ ∈ S, it must be that ρ(θ′) = r′ for some θ′ ≥ τv. In all states
θ > τm such that ρ(θ) ∈ S, the outlet must deliver the same least expensive report r′ ∈ S
such that β(r′) = i. Thus, S has measure zero and ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τm.
Lemma A.4. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(·) is discontinuous at some θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a generic equilibrium where ρ(θ)
is continuous in Θ. From Lemma A.3, we know that ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ τm. If ρ(θ) = θ
also for all θ > τm, then the equilibrium would be fully revealing. In such case, the outlet
could profitably deviate by reporting τv when the state is θ ∈ (τv − ǫ, τv) for some ǫ > 0.
Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ′) 6= θ′ for some state θ′ > τm. By Lemma A.2, it has to
be that ρ(θ′) < θ′, or otherwise ρ(·) would be discontinuous; therefore Lemmata A.1 and
A.2 imply that ρ(θ) = ρ(θ′) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ(θ′), τm}, supΘ). There always exists a
report r′ ≥ θ′ such that inf J(r′) ≥ max{ρ(θ′), τm}. Since β(ρ(θ′)) = i, it must be that
B(J(r′), r′) = i. Therefore, there are states where the media outlet would have a profitable
deviation, contradicting that a continuous ρ(·) can be part of a generic equilibrium.
Lemma A.5. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(·) has a unique discontinuity in state θδ,
where θδ ∈ [τm, τv]. The reporting rule51 is such that ρ(θ) = ρ+(θδ) > θδ = l(ρ+(θδ)) for
θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)) and ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ (inf Θ, θδ) ∪ [ρ+(θδ), supΘ).
Proof. I denote by θδ the lowest state in which a discontinuity of ρ(·) occurs. By Lem-
mata A.3 and A.4, we know that in equilibrium such a discontinuity exists and θδ ≥ τm.
Suppose that ρ−(θδ) 6= θδ. If ρ−(θδ) < θδ, then by Lemmata A.1 and A.2 we have that
ρ(θ) = ρ−(θδ) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ−(θδ), τm}, θδ) and ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ max{ρ−(θδ), τm}.
In equilibrium, it has to be that β(ρ−(θδ)) = i and β(r
′) = c for every off-path r′ ∈
(max{ρ−(θδ), τm}, θδ). Hence, every report r′ ∈ (max{ρ−(θδ), τm}, θδ) is equilibrium
dominated for all θ < θ′, where θ′ = {θ ∈ Θ |C(ρ−(θδ), θ) = C(r′, θ)}. Therefore,
B(J(r′), r′) = i, and the media outlet could profitably deviate by reporting r′ instead
of ρ−(θδ) when θ ∈ (θ′, θδ). Suppose now that ρ−(θδ) > θδ. By Lemma A.1 we have
ρ−(τm) = τm, and thus it has to be that θδ > τm. Similarly to the previous case, in
equilibrium it must be that ρ(θ) = ρ−(θδ) for all θ ∈ (τm, θδ). This is in contradiction
to θδ being the lowest discontinuity, as we would have ρ
+(τm) > τm. Therefore, in every
generic equilibrium, ρ−(θδ) = θδ ≥ τm and ρ(θ) = θ for θ < θδ.
51Recall that ρ+(t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and ρ
−(t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
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From Lemmata A.1 and A.2, it follows that ρ+(θδ) > θδ and ρ(θ) = ρ
+(θδ) for every
θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)]: since it must be that β(ρ+(θδ)) = i, the outlet would profitably deviate
by reporting ρ+(θδ) in every state θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)] such that ρ(θ) > ρ+(θδ). To prevent
other profitable deviations, ρ+(θδ) must be such that ξ ≤ kC(ρ+(θδ), θ) for θ ∈ (τm, θδ)
and ξ ≥ kC(ρ+(θδ), θ) for all θ ∈ [θδ, ρ+(θδ)]. Together, these conditions imply that
θδ = l(ρ
+(θδ)). Any off-path report r
′ > ρ+(θδ) would be equilibrium-dominated by all
θ ≤ ρ+(θδ), yielding B(J(r′), r′) = i. Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ≥ ρ+(θδ),
and ρ(θ) = ρ+(θδ) for θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)).
Suppose now that θδ > τv. Given the reporting rule, posterior beliefs p must be
degenerate on θ = r for all r ∈ [τv, θδ). In this case, there always exists an ǫ > 0 such
that the outlet can profitably deviate by reporting τv instead of θ in states θ ∈ (τv − ǫ, τv).
Therefore, θδ ∈ [τm, τv].
Proposition A.1. A pair (ρ(θ), p(θ | r)) is a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ if and only if, for

































if θ ∈ (l (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ))
θ otherwise.






, ρ(θ) = r̂(λ) for θ ∈ [l(r̂(λ)), r̂(λ)), and ρ(θ) = θ otherwise.52
ii) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep[θ |r̂(λ)] = λ, Ep[θ |r] < τv for every off-path r, and p(θ | r) are degenerate on
θ = r otherwise.
Proof. Given the reporting rule ρ(·) described in Lemma A.5, beliefs p must be such
that β(ρ+(θδ)) = i, and thus Ep[θ | ρ+(θδ)] = ρ
+(θδ)+θδ
2
≥ τv. With square loss misre-









Since θδ = l(ρ












. Similarly, for a general misreporting cost function C(r, θ), the expectation
Ep[θ | ρ+(θδ)] has to be between τv and τv+r̄(τv)2 , where r̄(θ) is defined for a θ > τm as
r̄(θ) = max {r ∈ R|kC(r, θ) = ξ}. I define the pooling report r̂(λ) as
r̂(λ) := {r ∈ R | Ef [θ | l(r) < θ < r] = λ} .
52Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ) due to the media outlet being indifferent between reporting
l(r̂(λ)) and r̂(λ) when the state is θ = l(r̂(λ)) > τm.
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r̂(λ) if θ ∈ (l (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ))
θ otherwise.
(2)




it must be that (2) has ρ(l(r̂(λ))) = r̂(λ); otherwise the outlet would profitably deviate
by reporting τv when the state is θ ∈ (τv − ǫ, τv + ǫ) for some ǫ > 0. Since θ ∼ U , when





if l(r̂(λ)) > τm and r̂(λ) = 2λ− τm otherwise.
By applying Bayes’ rule to (2), we obtain that posterior beliefs p(θ|r) are such that






, and are degenerate on θ = r for all r /∈ [l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)). For
every off-path report r′ ∈ (l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)) it must be that Ep[θ | r′] < τv to have β(r′) = c.
These off-path beliefs are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion since for every r′ ∈
(l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)) we have that inf J(r′) < l(r̂(λ)) ≤ τv, and thus c ∈ B(J(r′), r′). The proof
is completed by the observation that the pair (ρ(θ), p(θ|r)) described in Proposition A.1







Proof of Lemma 1. For the case τm < τv, Proposition A.1 shows that there is a contin-
uum of generic equilibria of Γ̂ parameterized by the expectation λ = E[θ|r̂(λ)]. Given costs









, and τm < τv, in a generic equilibrium there is per-
suasion when θ ∈ (l(r̂(λ)), τv). Therefore, λ = τv maximizes the media outlet’s expected









, if l(r̂(τv)) > τm, then l(r̂(λ)) > l(r̂(τv));
if l(r̂(τv)) = τm, then l(r̂(λ)) ≥ τm and r̂(λ) > r̂(τv). That is, in the generic equilibrium
where λ = τv, the media outlet is either more likely to persuade the voter at the same
expected cost, or is at least equally likely to persuade the voter at a strictly lower cost
compared to generic equilibria where λ > τv. The sender-preferred equilibrium reporting
rule ρ(·) and beliefs p follow from Proposition A.1, where the case τm > τv is obtained in
a similar way as τm < τv, and the case τm = τv follows by setting τm → τv in the generic
equilibrium of Proposition A.1 where λ = τv.
A.2 The Policy-making Stage
A.2.1 The Challenger’s Best Response
Given the equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂ (see Lemma 1) and a policy
proposal by the incumbent qi, the expected utility of the challenger is Vc(q) = l(r
∗(q))
if τm(q) < τv(q), and Vc(q) = h(r
∗(q)) if τm(q) > τv(q). We have that τm(q) = τv(q)
only if qc = qi; in this case, the challenger ensures her electoral victory half the time by
mimicking the incumbent’s proposal, and Vc(q) = 0. By contrast, τv(q) > τm(q) when
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qc > qi, and τv(q) < τm(q) otherwise. I define the “best response to the left” BR
L
c (qi) as
the best response of the challenger to policy qi subject to the constraint that qc ≤ qi, that
is, BRLc (qi) = argmaxqc≤qi Vc(q). The “best response to the right” is similarly defined as
BRRc (qi) = argmaxqc≥qi Vc(q).





qi if qi ≤ ϕm































Proof. Given qc < qi and the equilibrium in Lemma 1, the challenger wins when θ <

















When h(r∗(q)) < τm(q), the pooling report is r








2γ(ϕv − qc) > 0 and ∂τm(q)∂qc = 2γ(ϕm − qc) < 0 for all qc ∈ [ϕm, ϕv]. Thus, the expected
utility of the challenger Vc(q) = h(r
∗(q)) is maximized, subject to qc < qi, when qc is such
that h(r∗(q)) = τm(q). This last equality is satisfied when qc = q̃c(qi), where






Therefore, as long as q̃c(qi) ∈ [ϕm, ϕv], we have that BRLc (qi) = q̃c(qi). Since policies
qj /∈ [ϕm, ϕv], j ∈ {i, c}, are never optimal, it follows that if q̃c(qi) < ϕm ≤ qi, then
BRLc (qi) = ϕm; if qi < ϕm, then BR
L
c (qi) = qi; if q̃c(qi) > ϕv, then BR
L
c (qi) = ϕv. The
proof is completed by solving for these inequalities.













Proof. Given qc > qi and the equilibrium in Lemma 1, the challenger wins the election






, we can proceed as in Step 1: the policy qc
such that l(r∗(q)) = τm(q) minimizes Vc(q) subject to qc ≥ qi, and thus BRRc (qi) = ϕv as
long as l(r∗(qi, ϕv)) > 0. Otherwise, the challenger would be better off by imitating the
incumbent with qc = qi, thereby ensuring herself a payoff of Vc(q) = 0. The condition





ξ/k, completing the proof.
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ϕv if qi ∈
[





and k ≥ k̄
qi − η(k) if qi ∈
[






and k ≥ k̄































and k̄ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
.
Proof. Given a policy qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv] and best responses BRLc (qi), BRRc (qi) as in Steps 1 and
2, we have that
∂Vc(qi,BRRc (qi))
∂qi





















, then BRc(qi) = BR
R
c (qi) for all qi ∈ [ϕm, q′i]
and BRc(qi) = BR
L
c (qi) for all qi ∈ [q′i, ϕv]. As a first step, I compare Vc (qi, q̃c(qi)) and
Vc (qi, ϕv). When qc < qi and (qc − qi)2 ≤ ξ16γ2k(ϕm−ϕv)2 , we have that h(r
∗(qi, qc)) =
τm(qi, qc), and therefore Vc (qi, q̃c(qi)) = τm(qi, q̃c(qi)) and Vc (qi, ϕv) = l(r
∗(qi, ϕv)) =




. The challenger’s expected utility from “best replying to the left” with
q̃c(qi) is




















Thus, the condition τm(qi, q̃c(qi)) = l(r
∗(qi, ϕv)) can be rewritten as










































Since Vc(qi, qi) = 0, I do not need to consider the case where BR
R
c (qi) = qi as the




c − qi)2 ≥ 0 by
proposing q′c = max{ϕm, q̃c(qi)}. Since BRLc (qi) = ϕm when q̃c(qi) < ϕm and qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv],
the comparison between Vc(qi, q̃c(qi)) and Vc(qi, ϕv) makes sense as long as q̃c(qi) ≥ ϕm
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for all qi ∈ [q̄′, ϕv]. Given that ∂q̃c(qi)∂qi = 1, the condition is q̃c(q̄









, then we have that q̃c(qi) < ϕm and thus BR
L
c (qi) = ϕm for some qi ≥ q̄′. In
this case, the relevant comparison is between Vc(qi, ϕm) = τm(qi, ϕm) and Vc(qi, ϕv): by
equating τm(qi, ϕm) = l(r




















that BRc(qi) = ϕv for all qi ∈ [ϕm, q̄′′] and BRc(qi) = BRLc (qi) for qi ∈ [q̄′′, ϕv]. Moreover,
BRLc (qi) = q̃c(qi) as long as q̃c(qi) ≥ ϕm, and BRLc (qi) = ϕm otherwise. We have that
q̃c(qi) ≥ ϕm when qi ≥ q̄′′′, where













Proof of Proposition 1. I denote by V̂i(qi) ≡ Vi(qi, BRc(qi)) the utility of the incum-
bent given that qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv] and qc = BRc(qi), where the challenger’s best response
BRc(qi) is as in Proposition A.2. Since an equilibrium is a sender-preferred PBE, when
the challenger is indifferent between some policies, she selects the policy that is closer to
the media outlet’s bliss ϕm. Given that h(r






−l(r∗(qi, ϕv)) if qi ∈
[





and k ≥ k̄
−τm(qi, q̃c(qi)) if qi ∈
[






and k ≥ k̄






























and k̄ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
. Henceforth, I will use the following notation:




, q̄′′ = ϕv+ϕm
2
− η(k), and q̄′′′ = ϕm + η(k).
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When k ≥ k̄, the utility V̂i(qi) is increasing in qi until qi = q̄′, and decreasing afterwards,
as ∂V̂i(qi)
∂qi
= 2γ(ϕv − qi) > 0 for qi ∈ [ϕm, q̄′] and ∂V̂i(qi)∂qi = 2γ(ϕm − qi) < 0 for qi ∈ [q̄
′, ϕv].
Since −l(r∗(q̄′, ϕv)) = −τm(qi, q̃c(qi)), it follows that qi = q̄′ maximizes V̂i(qi) for k ≥ k̄.
The challenger replies to qi = q̄
′ with the sender-preferred policy qc = q̃c(q̄
′).
There are three different configurations to consider when the misreporting costs are
lower than k̄: (i) when k̄
4
≤ k < k̄, the relevant thresholds are contained within the bliss
policies of the voter and the media outlet, ϕm ≤ q̄′′ < q̄′′′ < ϕv; (ii) when k̄16 ≤ k < k̄4 , the
threshold q̄′′ is lower than the media outlet’s bliss ϕm, and we have q̄
′′ < ϕm < q̄
′′′ ≤ ϕv;
(iii) when 0 < k < k̄
16
, both thresholds are beyond the bliss policies, q̄′′ < ϕm < ϕv < q̄
′′′.










0 for qi ∈ [ϕm, q̄′′]; ∂V̂i(qi)∂qi =
∂−τm(qi,ϕm)
∂qi







< 0 for qi ∈ [q̄′′′, ϕv]. Since −l(r∗(q̄′′, ϕv)) = −τm(q̄′′, ϕm)





maximizes V̂i(qi) by selecting qi = q̄
′′, and the challenger best responds to q̄′′ by proposing
the sender-preferred policy qc = ϕm.
The same line of reasoning can be extended to the other two cases: when k̄
16
≤ k < k̄
4
,
the incumbent proposes qi = q̄




both the incumbent and the challenger propose qj = ϕm, j ∈ {i, c}. The proposition
follows by denoting q∗i (k) = argmaxqi∈R V̂i(qi) and q
∗
c (qi, k) = minBRc(qi).
Corollary A.1. The equilibrium in Proposition 1 exists if and only if
φ ≥ min
{
γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + 12
√
ξ/k, 3γ(ϕv − ϕm)2
}
.
Proof. Consider the sender-preferred equilibrium of Γ̂ in Lemma 1 and the equilibrium
policies in Proposition 1. When k ∈ (0, k̄/4], we have that q∗(k) = (ϕm, ϕm). Suppose that
the challenger deviates from the prescribed equilibrium strategy by proposing qc = ϕv. If
φ < r∗(ϕm, ϕv), then there is no report that can convince the voter to cast a ballot for the
incumbent, and the deviation would be profitable. Therefore, to ensure the existence of an
equilibrium as in Proposition 1, it is necessary that φ ≥ r∗(ϕm, ϕv). Given that for q such
that qj ∈ [ϕm, ϕv], j ∈ {i, c}, τv(q) is maximized when qi = ϕm and qc = ϕv, the condition
is also sufficient. The proof is completed by τv(ϕm, ϕv) = γ(ϕv−ϕm)2 = −τm(ϕm, ϕv).
A.3 Voter’s Welfare
To ease notation, in this section I will use q∗c (q
∗
i (k), k) ≡ q∗c (q∗i (k)).
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium policies q∗(k) are such
that q∗i (k) ≥ q∗c (q∗i (k)) for every k > 0. Moreover, since (q∗c (q∗i (k))− q∗i (k))2 ≤ ξ16γ2k(ϕm−ϕv)2 ,
we have that h(r∗(q∗(k))) = τm(q
∗(k)) for every k > 0. Given the equilibrium of the
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communication subgame Γ̂ (Proposition A.1 and Lemma 1) and that θ ∼ U [−φ, φ], the
incumbent wins with ex-ante probability φ−τm(q
∗(k))
2φ
. When the incumbent is elected,
the voter receives an expected utility of −γ(ϕv − q∗i (k))2 + Ef [θ|θ > τm(q∗(k))], where
Ef [θ|θ > τm(q∗(k))] = φ+τm(q
∗(k))
2
. When the challenger is elected, the voter obtains a
utility of −γ(ϕv − q∗c (q∗i (k)))2. Therefore, the voter’s equilibrium welfare can be written as

























, since τm(q) = 0 for q = (ϕm, ϕm), equation (4) reduces to
W ∗v (k) = −γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4. Therefore, the voter’s equilibrium welfare W ∗v (k) is









. The derivative of the voter’s welfare with






























































∗(k)) − τm(q∗(k)) = 2γ(ϕm − q∗i (k))(ϕv − ϕm) and τm(q∗(k)) = γ(ϕm −
q∗i (k))









(φ− τm(q∗(k)))(ϕv − q∗i (k))− 2γ(q∗i (k)− ϕm)2(ϕv − ϕm)
]
. (6)




, the term (φ − τm(q∗(k)))(ϕv − q∗i (k)) continuously
decreases while the term (q∗i (k)− ϕm)2(ϕv − ϕm) continuously increases. Therefore, the





























equation (6) to obtain that
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(ϕv − ϕm) > 0.





Consider now the case where the misreporting costs are relatively high, k ≥ k̄. I
rewrite the welfare function in equation (4) by explicitly separating the expected gains
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from quality, i.e.,
















−γ(ϕv − q∗i (k))2
]
+





∗(k)) = γ (2ϕm − q∗c (qi(k))− q∗i (k)) (q∗c (qi(k))− q∗i (k)) is positive as
q∗i (k) > q
∗






















i (k))− q∗i (k))












































where we obtain ∂τm(q
∗(k))
∂k



































< 0, the probability that the challenger (in-
cumbent) wins the election decreases (increases) as k increases. Both policies q∗i (k)
and q∗c (q
∗
i (k)) increase with k ≥ k̄, with limk→∞ q∗i (k) = limk→∞ q∗c (q∗i (k)) = ϕv. Since
ϕv > q
∗




i (k)) for every finite k ≥ k̄, the voter always prefers policy q∗i (k)
to q∗c (q
∗












> 0. Therefore, as k increases, the voter has
better policy proposals, a higher probability of implementing her favorite policy, and
higher expected gains from quality. It follows that, for every finite k ≥ k̄, ∂W ∗v (k)
∂k
> 0. The
proof is completed by noting from equation (4) that limk→∞ W
∗
v (k) = Ŵv = φ/4.
Proof of Corollary 1. In the absence of a media outlet, the median voter theorem holds
and both candidates offer ϕv. The voter, being uninformed, cannot do better than select
candidates randomly given proposals q = (ϕv, ϕv). Therefore, the voter’s expected payoff
without a media outlet is −γ(ϕv −ϕv)2 +Ef [θ] = 0. From Proposition 2 we have that the




. Moreover, W ∗v (k) is continuous





−γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4 < 0 there exists a k′ > k̄/4 such that W ∗v (k) < 0 for all k ∈ (0, k′)
and W ∗v (k) > 0 for all k > k
′.




respect to k, where q∗(k) is as in Proposition 1. Since τm(q
∗(k)) > 0 for every finite k > k̄/4
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and τm(q









where ι(k) = 1
2
. Moreover, since limk→∞ τm(q
∗(k)) = 0, then limk→∞ ι(k) = 1/2.
B Supplementary Appendix
B.1 Ideological Media
In this section, I consider the case where the media outlet’s political gains are purely policy
dependent. Consider the media outlet’s preferences over candidates as stated in Section 3.
Given the realized state θ, the outlet payoff from persuading the voter is θ − τm(q) if
θ ∈ (τv(q), τm(q)) and τm(q)− θ if θ ∈ (τm(q), τv(q)). From the candidates’ perspective,
the expected amount of resources that—given policies q—the media outlet can use for
misreporting information is therefore |τm(q)|, as Ef [θ] = 0. Hereafter, I indicate the media
outlet’s expected political gains with ξ̂(q) = |τm(q)|. When qi = qc the media outlet
always reports truthfully the value of the state θ as there are no gains from persuasion
(this is true also at the interim stage). When instead policies are different from each other,
the outlet has an incentive to persuade the voter that is proportional to |τm(q)|. Notice
that, given any pair of policies q, the analysis of the communication subgame is unaltered.
I now turn to study the policy-making stage when ξ̂(q) = |τm(q)|. Hereafter, I
refer to the analysis previously performed in Appendix A.2. Consider the challenger’s
“best response to the left,” with qc ≤ qi. In this case, we have that ξ̂(q) = τm(q) > 0.
Recall that, in equilibrium, the challenger wins the election when θ < h(r∗(q)), where




τm(q)/k. Differently than the case where the media outlet’s gains ξ
are fixed, now the derivative dh(r
∗(q))
dqc
is not always positive. Since h(r∗(q)) is concave in
qc, h(r
∗(·)) has a maximum when qc is such that dh(r
∗(q))
dqc
= 0. Therefore, the challenger
maximizes her payoff when qc is such that either
dh(r∗(q))
dqc




> 0 and h(r∗(q)) = τm(q). In particular, we have that
dh(r∗(q))
dqc




























The left-hand side of the above equation is always positive for qc ∈ (ϕm, ϕv), it is decreasing
in qc, and it has a vertical asymptote at ϕm. In particular, the LHS goes to ∞ as qc ↓ ϕm.
The right-hand side of the above equation is always positive, increasing in qc, and it has a
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vertical asymptote such that the RHS goes to ∞ as qc ↑ qi. Therefore, the solution to the
above equation is some q∗c ∈ (ϕm, qi) such that Vc(qi, q∗c ) = h(r∗(qi, q∗c )) > 0.
Suppose that the challenger’s best response “from the left” is some q∗c ≤ qi such that
h(r∗(qi, q
∗
c )) = τm(qi, q
∗
c ). In this case, there are two solutions to the condition h(r
∗(q)) =
τm(q): the first is the trivial one where qc = qi, and Vc(q) = h(r
∗(q)) = τm(q) = 0; the
second (implicit) solution is again some q∗c ∈ (ϕm, qi). To see this, notice that τm(q) is
positive and continuously decreasing in qc, with τm(qc = qi) = 0. Instead, h(r
∗(q)) has a
global maximum at some qhc < qi, with h(r
∗(qi, q
h
c )) > 0 while
53 h(r∗(qi, qc = ϕm)) < 0.





> 0, then it must be that
q∗c ∈ (ϕm, qi) and Vc(qi, q∗c ) = h(r∗(qi, q∗c )) > 0. This second solution gives a higher payoff
to the challenger than qc = qi. Therefore, qc = qi is never a best response “to the left,” and
BRLc (qi) always ensures the challenger a second mover advantage as Vc(BR
L
c (qi), qi) > 0.
In contrast with the case where political gains ξ are fixed, here the challenger does not
offer the outlet’s preferred policy ϕm even when k is relatively small.
The analysis of the “best response to the right” BRRc (qi), where qc ≥ qi, is similar (see
also Appendix A.2.1). In this case, we have that ξ̂(q) = −τm(q) and, in equilibrium, the
challenger wins when θ < l(r∗(q)) = τv(q)− 12
√
−τm(q)/k. Therefore, as in the analysis







As in the case where political gains are fixed, the incumbent seeks to minimize the
challenger’s expected payoff. From the above analysis, we know that the challenger can
secure an expected payoff of Vc(qi, BRc(qi)) > 0 with a qc = BRc(qi) 6= qi. By proposing
policies that are closer to ϕv, the incumbent reduces the challenger’s payoff from proposing
BRRc (qi) but increases the challenger’s payoff from proposing BR
L
c (qi). To see this, consider
q′i > qi such that ϕm ≤ qi < q′i ≤ ϕv. When the incumbent proposes q′i, the challenger has
the option of proposing a q′c ∈ (BRLc (qi), q′i) such that q′i−q′c = qi−BRLc (qi). This strategy
maintains unaltered the size of conflict of interest |τv(q)− τm(q)| ∝ |qc − qi|, it increases











c (qi))) = Vc(qi, BR
L
c (qi))) > 0. A similar
argument holds for the challenger’s best response to the right BRRc (q
′
i).
The extent to which the media outlet can persuade the voter depends on the ratio
ξ̂(q)/k. When misreporting costs grow arbitrarily large, k → +∞, the outlet always
reveals the state and the policies of both candidates converge to ϕv. By contrast, when
k → 0+, the policies of both candidates converge to ϕm. To see this, suppose that qi = ϕm
and qc ∈ (ϕm, ϕv]. No matter how close qi and qc are, the outlet obtains full persuasion as
k → 0+, and therefore the incumbent wins when θ > l(r∗(ϕm, qc)) = τm(ϕm, qc). Since
τm(ϕm, qc) < 0, the expected payoff of the challenger is lower than the payoff she would
get by proposing ϕm as well, Vc(ϕm, qc) < 0 = Vc(ϕm, ϕm). A similar argument applies to
53Notice that h(r∗(qi, qc = ϕm)) = (ϕm − qi)
[






the case where qc = ϕm and qi ∈ (ϕm, ϕv]. Therefore, when k → 0+, candidates best reply
to each other by proposing ϕm.
We obtain that equilibrium policies converge to ϕv as k → +∞, to ϕm as k → 0+, and
diverge otherwise for intermediate levels of k, with q∗i (k) 6= q∗c (q∗i (k), k). As in the main
analysis, policy divergence implies an increased conflict of interest between the media
outlet and the voter, and thus more misreporting and persuasion.54 Therefore, the main
results of this paper about the relationship between the rate of persuasion and the level
of misreporting costs carry through even when using policy dependent political gains ξ̂(q)
for the media outlet.
B.2 Equilibrium of the Communication Subgame
Lemma B.1. The sender-preferred generic equilibrium of Γ̂, where λ = τv, is also the
unique perfect sequential equilibrium (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986) of Γ̂.
Proof. First, since the concept of perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE) is stronger than
the Intuitive Criterion, every PBE of the communication subgame that is eliminated by
the Intuitive Criterion is not perfectly sequential. Consider now a generic equilibrium of








as in Proposition A.1. I define K(r, λ) as the set of types
that can potentially gain by deliverning an off-path report r ∈ (l(r̂(λ)), r̂(λ)). Formally,
K(r, λ) = (l(r), ϑ(r)), where ϑ(r) = {θ′|C(r, θ′) = C(r̂(λ), θ′) and r < θ′ < r̂(λ)}. Notice








, and it is thus off-path in these
equilibria. Given that Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv)), r̂(τv))] = τv (see Proposition A.1), it follows









, upon observing the off-path report r̂(τv) the voter conjectures that
such a report has been delivered from types of sender in the set K(r̂(τv), λ). The voter’s
updated “consistent” beliefs pK are the conditional distribution of the outlet’s type given
that θ ∈ K(r̂(τv), λ). Given beliefs pK , the voter casts a ballot for the incumbent, as
EpK [θ] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv)), ϑ(r̂(τv)))] > τv. This makes a deviation to r̂(τv) profitable only








are not perfectly sequential. Finally, consider the generic equilibrium with λ = τv. In
this case, every off-path report r′ ∈ (l(r̂(τv)), r̂(τv)) induces consistent beliefs such that
EpK [θ] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r′), ϑ(r′))] < τv, and the voter casts a ballot for the challenger
after observing r′. No type of sender would benefit from delivering any off-path report
r′ ∈ (l(r̂(τv)), r̂(τv)), and thus this equilibrium is perfectly sequential. Therefore, the
generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ = τv is the only perfect sequential equilibrium of Γ̂.
Lemma B.2. The undefeated (Mailath et al., 1993) generic equilibrium of Γ̂ is unique
and it has λ = τv.
54Notice that, for this argument, it is irrelevant whether the challenger best responds to the left or to
the right. Therefore, the results are robust to the challenger’s tie breaking rule.
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Proof. Denote the set of generic equilibria of Γ̂ with GE(Γ̂) (see Proposition A.1). With
a slight abuse of notation, say that um(ρ, p, λ, θ) denotes the media outlet’s payoff in the
generic equilibrium (ρ, p) with parameter λ and when the state is θ. From Mailath et al.
(1993), (ρ, p) ∈ GE(Γ̂) defeats (ρ′, p′) ∈ GE(Γ̂) if there exists a report r ∈ Θ such that
(i) ρ′(θ) 6= r for every θ ∈ Θ, and κ(r) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|ρ(θ) = r} 6= ∅; (ii) for every θ ∈ κ(r),
um(ρ, p, λ, θ) ≥ um(ρ′, p′, λ, θ), with the inequality being strict for some θ ∈ κ(r); (iii)
there is some θ ∈ κ(r) such that p′(θ|r) is different from the conditional probability that
the state is in κ(r).
Consider now the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ = τv, and notice that r̂(τv) is









θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv)), r̂(τv)), we have that um(·, λ = τv, θ) = ξ − kC(r̂(τv), θ) > um(·, λ′, θ) as
either um(·, λ′, θ) = 0 or um(·, λ′, θ) = ξ − kC(r̂(λ′), θ). Finally, Ef [θ|θ ∈ κ(r̂(τv))] = τv,
and therefore p′(θ|r̂(τv)) must differ from the conditional probability of θ ∈ κ(r̂(τv)) for
the voter to select the challenger upon observing r̂(τv) in generic equilibria with λ
′ 6= τv.
Hence, the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ = τv defeats every other generic equilibria of Γ̂.
Reports in (l(r̂(τv)), l(r̂(λ
′))) are the only reports that are on-path in a generic equilib-








but not when λ = τv. In all these generic equilibria,
upon observing a r′ ∈ (l(r̂(τv)), l(r̂(λ′))) the voter casts a ballot for the challenger. There-
fore, no generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with parameter λ′ can defeat the one with λ = τv.
Hence, the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with parameter λ = τv is the only undefeated generic
equilibrium of the communication subgame.
Corollary B.1. The set of equilibrium payoffs that the voter can obtain in a PBE robust
to the Intuitive Criterion is W(k) =
[
W ∗v (k), Ŵv
]
, where W ∗v (k) is as in equation (4) and
Ŵv = φ/4 is the full-information welfare.
Proof. By definition, equation (4) describes the lowest payoff the voter can receive in
a PBE robust to the Intuitive Criterion. As assumed in Appendix A.2.2, suppose that
the challenger selects the voter’s least preferred policy when indifferent, and consider
a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ as in Proposition A.1. By the continuity of l(r) and h(r)
with respect to r, and of r∗(λ) with respect to λ, we obtain that the voter’s equilibrium








: for higher λ,
the set of states in which persuasion occurs (weakly) shrinks and both the incumbent
and the challenger’s policies get (weakly) closer to the voter’s bliss policy ϕv. When




ξ/k there is no persuasion at all, and the voter always votes for her
preferred candidate as if under complete information. Since the media outlet has no
persuasive power, the median voter theorem holds and both candidates propose ϕv. In
this case the voter’s welfare is Ŵv = φ/4, and therefore in a PBE robust to the Intuitive
Criterion the voter can obtain any payoff in the set
[





Lemma B.3. Suppose that candidates propose policies simultaneously. Then, if k ≤ k̄/4
there is an equilibrium where both policies converge to ϕm.
Proof. Consider a variation of the model in Section 3 such that candidates propose poli-
cies simultaneously rather than sequentially. Suppose that there is an equilibrium where
q′ = (ϕm, ϕm), and notice that τv(q
′) = τm(q
′) = Vj(q
′) = 0, j ∈ {i, c}. A deviation by the
challenger to some qc > ϕm cannot be profitable if Vc(ϕm, qc) = l(r
∗(ϕm, qc)) ≤ 0, where
l(r∗(ϕm, qc)) = max{r∗(ϕm, qc) −
√




ξ/k, 2τv(ϕm, qc)−τm(ϕm, qc)}. Since for a qc ∈ (ϕm, ϕv) we have that ∂τm(ϕm, qc)/∂qc <
0 < ∂τv(ϕm, qc)/∂qc, and ∂τv(ϕm, qc)/∂qc = 0 when qc = ϕv, the challenger’s payoff
Vc(ϕm, qc) has a maximum either at qc = ϕm or at qc = ϕv. The condition Vc(ϕm, ϕv) ≤ 0
gives us k ≤ ξ/4γ2(ϕv − ϕm)4 = k̄/4. Therefore, when k ≤ k̄/4 there is an equilibrium
where policies converge to (ϕm, ϕm).
Lemma B.4. Suppose that candidates propose policies simultaneously. Then, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium in the policy-making stage when k ≥ k̄.
Proof. Suppose that candidates propose policies simultaneously and that k ≥ k̄. Since
candidates are symmetric, their best response functions are symmetric as well. From
Proposition A.2 the best response of the challenger to a qi is either ϕv or qi − η(k). Since
qj − η(k) is always below the qj line for every finite k ≥ k̄, a pure strategy equilibrium
of the policy-making stage must have one of the two candidates proposing ϕv. Suppose
that qi = ϕv, and therefore BRc(ϕv) = ϕv − η(k). From Proposition A.2 we obtain that
BRi(BRc(ϕv)) = ϕv only if ϕv−η(k) ≤ ϕv+η(k)− 4
√
ξ/γ2k. By rearranging and plugging
η(k) =
√





a condition is not satisfied at k = k̄, and therefore it is not satisfied for any finite k > k̄.
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